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ABSTRACT 
This research tries to explore the restraints imposed on customers in the contemporary Chinese 
housing market from the perspective of the customers. It adopts “power” as the core concept, 
uses the method of content analysis, and consults primarily theories of Max Weber, James 
Coleman, and Pierre Bourdieu. The research uses news reports as data to present the exercise 
of power on the customers by the Chinese state, and uses texts of housing advertisements as 
data to present the latent power the Chinese real-estate developers deploys to profit from trades 
with customers. Put together, the customers suffer from a “dual-domination” from the state and 
the developers in the contemporary Chinese housing market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This research focuses on the exercises of power in the Chinese housing market from a 
perspective of the Chinese customers in the market. The housing market is considered as an 
important segment of the economy in almost every country, which can be a result of its 
connection to space production. Space is an essential resource for any human individuals to 
live, and is associated with socioeconomic status of individuals. Hence, in modern societies, 
production of space is one of the most concerned issues related to the well-being of the people. 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) once adopted a planned residence production and 
distribution system, but has made attempts to let market mechanisms take over functions and 
responsibilities of the housing management. Today, a nominal housing market serves as the 
primary access to accommodations for most urban residents in the country; yet there are still 
many restraints on the market, especially regarding the customers’ freedom of choices. This is 
the topic that this research concerns.  
In this research, I use content analysis of the materials gathered from two Chinese cities 
in the year 2013 to explore the situations that customers on the contemporary Chinese housing 
market confront, the strategies of actions adopted by the Chinese state, the Chinese developers, 
and the Chinese customers themselves in these interactions, and the powers being exercised on 
the customers in these interactions. As a beginning, I would like to introduce some background 
information in order to help the readers understand the Chinese context better. 
 
1.1 The state in the contemporary Chinese residence development 
 
The beginning of the current housing market of China can be traced back to the early 
1980s, when the government under Deng Xiaoping launched reforms in the housing system of 
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PRC. (Zhou & Logan, 2002: 140) Nonetheless, reforms in the housing sector of PRC took 
rather a long time to generate the current system of the urban residence production. Markets 
where lands and residences could be bought and sold were not established in mainland China 
until the late 1980s (Wu & Wang, 2005; Li & Gibson, 2014), and it was not until 1998 that the 
Chinese state confirmed officially that the communist “welfare housing distribution” should be 
completely replaced by the market (Yang & Chen, 2014: 23). As a housing market, the Chinese 
housing market is still in its infancy. Prior to the reforms in the housing sector, the communist 
Chinese state was the ultimate landlord and developer in the country, being responsible for 
housing production, supplement, distribution, and management in urban China. Urban 
residences were all state-owned and Chinese urban residents had no freedom to choose and 
purchase residences (see Yang & Chen, 2014: 15; Zhang, 2002; Yang & Meng, 2005). In this 
regard, the contemporary Chinese housing market has witnessed a significant reduction of the 
scope of the state’s power. Yet the state, especially the governments on the local level, continue 
to exercise a strong influence on the Chinese housing market.  
The presence of the Chinese state can be proved in the first place by the fact that it retains 
legal ownerships of the lands. Unlike situations in some post-soviet countries where some lands 
are transferred to private sectors and individuals, in PRC all lands still remain public-owned 
even after the reform (Xie et al, 2002). There are two types of land ownership in PRC as 
prescribed by the laws: “state-owned” (guojia suoyou) lands, which are formally “owned by 
all people” (quanmin suoyou) while managed by governments “as representatives of the people” 
(daibiao renmin)1 (See Article 2, the Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of 
China [known as LAL hereinafter];) and “collectively-owned” (jiti suoyou) lands, which are 
owned by “collectivities of rural residents” (nongmin jiti) namely and distributed to and 
managed by “village committees” (cunmin weiyuanhui) of different rural communities 
                                                 
1 In fact, the word “guojia” in Chinese can be used to represent either “state”, “nation”, or “country”.  
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(villages) in practice. (See Article 8, 9, 10, and 11, LAL.) According to the Chinese laws, all 
lands in urban area are state-owned. Real-estate developers in China cannot obtain ownership 
of lands, but can only obtain rights of using lands from local governments (Xie et al, 2002) in 
transactions known as “transfers of the land use rights”2 (tudi shiyongquan churang, “transfers 
of lands” for short3). In this sense, it can be said that, in PRC, land cannot be sold, but can only 
be leased, according to legal definitions.  
The proactive role played by local governments in contemporary residence developments 
is associated with the local governments’ control over the ownership of land. Chinese real-
estate developers cannot obtain lands for constructions by themselves, but can only receive 
pieces of land designated for urban residential developments from the local governments, as 
such lands are de jure owned by the state4. Usage of particular pieces of land are also designated 
by the local governments in the governments’ local urban plans. Transfers of land use rights 
also involve monetary transactions that benefits the local governments. The Chinese legal 
system prescribes three methods of transferring rights of using state-owned land pieces 
designated for urban residential developments to real-estate developers: auction (paimai), 
tender (zhaobiao), and listing (guapai, See Article 13, UREAL and Article 15, Regulations of 
Transferring Land Use Rights by Tender, Auction, or Listing [known as RBAL hereinafter]), 
all of which involve price-competing in land prices5 quotation. (See Article 14 and 17, RBAL; 
Yang & Chen, 2014: 27-28.) Going through auction/tender/listing system has been a must for 
any party to obtain lands in China since 2004. (Peng & Thibodeau, 2011) Developers can only 
obtain pieces of lands by winning bids and paying the amount of their winning-bid prices to 
local governments. Sums paid in this way are called “fees of transferring state-owned land use 
                                                 
2 Some sources translate “land use rights” as “right of land using / using land / right of land usage”. 
3 Because of the legal ownership of lands remain absolutely unchanged, omitting the “rights of using” part in terms are 
common practices in Chinese. In this case, “tudi shiyongquan churang” is simplified as “tudi churang” (transfers of land[s]). 
4 In this research, a “piece of land” refer to a piece of land with explicit boundaries drawn; the original word in Chinese is 
dikuai, literally “land square” or “land block”. I choose the word “piece” to avoid confusion with “residential block”. 
5 Similar to “land transfer”, the phrase “land prices” in this research is an abbreviation of “price of land use rights”.  
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right” (guoyou tudi shiyong quan churang jin; see 2006: Notification of General Office of the 
State Council on Normalizing Managements of Receipt and Payment of Fees of Transferring 
State-owned Land Use Rights by General Office of State Council of PRC), also known as “land 
transfer fee” [tudi churang jin] for short), and are considered as financial incomes of the local 
governments.  
However, it is worth pointing out here that the power of contemporary Chinese local 
governments is a result of power redistribution within the system of the state rather than an 
artifact of the planned housing system. Many researchers point out that during and after the 
reforms, there was a power struggle between the national and local governments. Lin (1999, 
cited in Logan, 2002: 12) believes that the Chinese reform of housing sector eroded the capacity 
of the central state yet favored the local governments. Zhou (2007) points out that the extent of 
PRC central government’s control on the local governments in term of the financial affairs is 
greatly reduced. Paik (2014) argues that while local governments in PRC enter into patron-
client relations with real-estate developers, top leaders of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
regime cannot restrain such interest exchanges effectively, and can only condemn those patron-
client relations as collusions and corruptions. Similar power struggles are also recorded by Fu 
and Lin (2013). This phenomenon suggests that the current presence of the Chinese state in the 
housing market is not of an old planned-economic pattern, but rather roots in the contemporary 
residence production mechanisms. 
 
1.2 Residences as products on the Chinese housing market 
 
When discussing contemporary residential developments in China, the design of those 
residences developed is hard to ignore. The Chinese residences in urban areas are produced 
primarily in the form of residential compounds, also known as “microdistrict” (xiaoqu), whose 
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origin can be found in PRC’s Maoist period. The Chinese residential compounds under Mao’s 
regime are mostly consisted of residential structures of three to five floors, and were often 
“multifunctional” – with amenities such as social services, subsistence goods, recreation, and 
other services provided on the compounds. (Gaubatz, 1995: 32) In reforms of the housing 
systems of PRC, however, the prevailing type of Chinese residential compounds gradually 
transformed. Brazier, Fan, and Lam (2009) believe that the transformation of “microdistrict” 
primarily began with the capitalization of state-owned enterprises and private sector capitals’ 
entrances into Chinese market during Deng’s reforms. Today, Chinese residential compounds 
are built on pieces of lands that developers obtained from local governments. Residential 
structures, as well as infrastructures (roads, parking lots, etc.) and garden landscapes, are 
constructed in the delimited spaces set by boundaries of land pieces. A residential compound, 
or “microdistrict” 6, is a key category in marketing. To purchase a residence, a customer would 
choose a microdistrict first, then choose from residential units available in the chosen 
microdistrict. Contemporary microdistrict in China are usually enclosed for the convenience of 
management with only a few staffed entrances as accesses to the compound. Therefore, some 
researchers (for example, Fleischer [2010: 38]) call the new Chinese microdistricts “gated 
communities”. The primary effect of Chinese city landscapes formed by residential blocks and 
enclosed microdistricts on the housing market is on the mechanisms of marketing. The 
developers compete on the inter-microdistrict level, and customers choose microdistricts as 
well as choose dwelling units. As can be seen shortly after, contemporary Chinese housing 
advertisements are typically about microdistricts, rather than about specific dwelling units. 
Since this research focuses on contemporary situations in the Chinese housing market, it 
                                                 
6 There are multiple expressions for “microdistricts” in Chinese. Apart from “xiaoqu”, it can also be called – especially for 
relatively newer microdistricts, and especially in their selling phases, “loupan” (literally “set of buildings”, or “plate of 
buildings”). A new microdistrict, in abbreviation, can be called “xin pan”, (new “pan”; abbreviation of xin loupan [new 
“loupan”]). A microdistrict can also be called a “project” (xiangmu). In this dissertation, I would translate xiaoqu as 
“microdistrict”, loupan as “residential plot” (“pan” as “plot”; “xin pan” as “new plot”), and “xiangmu” as “project”. 
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is vital to outline the general shape and taxonomy of residences on the contemporary Chinese 
housing market here. Appearances of residences developed in China are highly distinctive. The 
most prevalent type of residences found on the Chinese housing market are dwelling units in 
multiple-floor buildings (residential blocks). They greatly resemble the “condos” in North 
America, as the dwelling units7 are similar to North American apartments in design, and are 
sold with legal ownership and can be recognized as private-owned8 properties. Detached 
houses, semi-detached houses, and townhouses are not frequently seen in Chinese housing 
market. These literal “houses” are commonly identified as “villa” (bieshu) in Chinese. Often 
recognized as luxuries, “villas” in China are marked by limited supplies and high selling prices. 
A clear comparison of the market share of villa can been seen in figure 1. Please notice that the 
category that contains “villa” also includes “luxury apartments”, and the statistics refer to 
revenues from sales. As the villa and luxury apartments have higher average prices per area 
unit, the total area of these luxury homes is likely to have a proportion in market supply even 
smaller than what are shown in figure 1.  
                                                 
7 The word “unit” here is translated from “danyuan” in Chinese. In China, residential blocks that have private kitchens and 
bathrooms in each suite are sometimes called “unites building” (“danyuanlou”).  
8 The Chinese property owners are recognized as having ownership of their dwellings. However, as stated above, they 
cannot legally own any piece of land because urban lands are all owned by the state.  
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Figure 1: Comparison of total amount of commercial residence sales revenue and "luxury" residence 
sales revenue, 2005-2013 (Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. Unit: 100 million Yuan) 
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The caption of figure 1 refers to a taxonomy of residences on the Chinese housing market: 
“commercial residence” (shangpin fang9). Residences sold on Chinese housing market fall in 
multiple types. For the residences on the Chinese housing market that are sold as private 
properties to the public10, there are two primary types that are differentiated by price setting 
mechanisms. “Commercial residences” have prices set around “reasonable prices” (or “normal 
prices”). The “reasonableness” (or “normality”) here is evaluated with market conditions. 
“Subsidized residences” (baozhang fang), the other major type, have prices reduced to a certain 
percentage lower than “reasonable prices”. Such reductions are compulsory, stipulated by 
regulations issued by the state. It should be pointed out here that not all sub-types of “subsidized 
residences” are sold as properties. For instance, some types like “public rental residences” 
(gong zu fang) and “low rent residences” (lian zu fang) are subsidized residences leased at 
lower prices. Types of subsidized residences that are sold as properties, such as “economical 
practical residences” (jingji shiyong fang) and “double-limited residences” (liangxian fang11), 
usually provide only partial property ownerships. As the “subsidized” in the title implies, 
subsidized residences are considered as a part of welfare system rather than common 
commodities on the housing market. Along with prices, two other aspects of subsidized 
residences are usually restricted. The first aspect is the social groups as targets of these 
residences’ provision. Subsidized residences can only be purchased by people or households 
with annual income less than a prescribed amount. The second aspect is the standard of designs. 
Subsidized residences are typically not of high qualities, as they are not produced as luxuries 
in the first place (Feng et al, 2007).  
                                                 
9 “Fang”, in Chinese, means “house”. However, as most residences on the contemporary Chinese housing market are not 
houses (detached, semi-detached, or townhouses), I would use the word “residences” in this manuscript to avoid confusions. 
10 In this research, I define “public” as “most of common customers on the market”. Purchases that accept applications of 
any customers in the market can be classified as “open to the public”, even if those purchases check eligibility of applicants 
afterwards. This classification excludes purchases that requires purchasers to have highly specific, exclusive social 
experiences. Counterexamples of residences not “sold to the public” include “settling residences” (anzhi fang) and 
“relocating residences” (huiqian fang): their sales are only open to people whose original dwellings are demolished for 
spaces of urban constructions, a process commonly known as chaiqian ( “demolition and move”) in Chinese.  
11 Residences of this type are called “double limit” because although the prices of these residence is limited, the total areas 
of the suites of these residences are restricted as well. 
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2. Conceptual framework of analysis 
 
The conceptual framework of this research is constructed mostly on theories of power by 
Weber and Foucault, and rational choice theories by James Coleman. The core concept in this 
research is “power relationship”, a notion directly connected with and derived from, but not 
equal to, the concept of “power”. In the social sciences, definitions of power have been 
changing and evolving. According to Haugaard & Clegg (2009: 2), Machiavelli simply viewed 
power as domination and control that works in subtle ways over others. Thomas Hobbes 
believed that power “flows from society to the individuals”, with violence and coercion as its 
ultimate backing, where the Sovereign holds a monopoly on these techniques (ibid: 2). In 19th 
century, Nietzsche, the famous philosopher, proposed a theory claiming power as a capacity of 
defining reality (ibid: 2). Definitions of power shown here diverge. Power can be defined 
referring to particular subjects and objects, as Hobbes did; or it can be defined to either deal 
with facts, or take its effect on what is called “subjective realities”, as suggested by Nietzsche. 
To make a definition applicable for a particular research, the researcher should find definitions 
that can fit to the context of that research. 
Gohler (2009: 28) proposes a distinction of power over and power to. According to Gohler, 
this division refers to “two fundamental dimensions of power”. Gohler considers power over 
as power over other individuals and power to as an ability to do or achieve something 
independent of others. Gohler’s division implies two fundamental orientations of the concept 
of “power” in English: one is vertical (power over) indicating submission of one side to the 
other in a bilateral relationship; another one is horizontal (power to) where actions of actors do 
not necessarily create any overriding or obedience. The two different orientations enlarges the 
scope that a conceptual framework centered by the notion “power” can cover.  
The Chinese housing market as a “quasi-market unilaterally controlled by the state” (see 
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Logan, 2002: 141 and Logan et al. 2009), also composes two domains, a “horizontal” one and 
a “vertical” one. The horizontal domain is the market, which is composed of sellers, or 
providers of the products, and the customers, or consumers. It is where trades of residences are 
made. I consider the market “horizontal” because the developers and customers typically find 
themselves on formally equal footing in trades. The vertical domain is the governance of the 
state, which includes the state and the objects of the state’s governance – actors in the market 
– connected by the state’s governmental behaviors. The state is found on a transcendent 
position here and regulates, limits, interferes, or prohibits behaviors of its objects; its objects, 
on the contrary, in predominately most occasions cannot fight back. Consequently, I consider 
the system of governance a vertical domain. The two types of power identified above exercise 
in domains with corresponding orientations. Consequently, powers of both orientations are 
adopted for this research, and should be defined. 
Clegg’s power to, as a definition of horizontal power, does not fit into discussions over 
market issues, since this definition excludes one’s interactions with other individuals. James 
Coleman’s rational choice theories, on the contrary, emphasizes social interactions. Coleman’s 
definition considers “power” as a measure of the value of resources that each actor begins with 
(or value of events that actor controls) in a transactional system. “Transactional system” here 
is defined with three elements: the actors; the resources or events; and the initial distribution 
of control of resources among the actors (Coleman, 1990: 132-133). Coleman’s interpretation 
of power and value in his own words forms a pair of “circular definitions”: 
 
The power of an actor resides in his control of valuable events. 
The value of an event lies in the interests powerful actors have in that event.  
(Coleman, 1990: 133) 
 
This circulation seems void in a stationary imagination, but is easy to understand if 
interpreted in a dynamic way. The value is, at any moment, being shaped by wills and interests 
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of all actors in a particular system (but is also affecting those wills and interest in return at the 
same time), while the degree of influence that a particular actor has on the definition of value 
is determined by his power in that particular system at that particular moment. In this approach, 
power is converted into an attribute of actors and is connected to the competitiveness of actors 
in transactions.  
Coleman’s definition of power has the following characteristics: on one hand, it fits with 
a usual interpretation of power that the greater the power an individual has, the greater the 
influence he can impose on others. On the other hand, as an attribute of actors, it is not 
monopolized by one part of a transaction. While the dominating side of a transaction has power, 
the dominated side also has it, although less. Power as an attribute is constantly shared by all 
actors in a particular system, in contrast with some “vertical” definitions of power. Hence 
Coleman’s definition of power fits better to discussions about trades and markets, as trades on 
markets forms no hierarchies and creates no superordinates and subordinates among actors on 
most occasions.  
For the definition of vertical power, I consulted Max Weber. Weber’s definition bears great 
similarity with Machiavelli’s and Hobbs’s, considering power to be a probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests. (Weber, 1969: 53) Weber’s definition is 
actually milder than Machiavelli’s “control over the others”, and the idea of “carry out his own 
will” resonate with not only Clegg’s power over, but also somehow with Clegg’s power to. Yet 
the two words “despite resistance” indicates interactions with – namely forcing – other actors. 
Therefore, Weber’s definition of “power” is more of the “vertical” type. Weber’s power is not 
perfect for my research, but it contours a basic feature of the vertical power: forcing, or 
compulsive. Obviously, this is the type of power that can be found deployed by the state in its 
enforcements of policies, which can be found in the context of Chinese housing market, where 
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the state plays an active role.  
In summary, some characteristics of the two types of power are as follows: 
Vertical power: one side forcing another side’s choice of behavior for a target; unilateral; 
apply for hierarchies and state’s governances. 
Horizontal power: each side imposing its own influence on the whole system; bilateral or 
multilateral; applies to trades and exchanges on the market. 
These characteristics provide basic definitions of power and its two types for my research. 
I would call horizontal power “transactional power” (as it is found in and takes effects trough 
trades) and call vertical power “governmental power” (as it is deployed by government in its 
operation), in accordance to the two domains where they are exercised respectively.  
Now that “power” is defined, it is time to think about the concept of “power relationship”. 
Literally, “power relationship” is a combination of power and social relationship. It can be 
either about how power operates in a social relationship, or refers to how a social relationship 
is driven by the power. In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault believes that mechanisms 
of power can be found in nearly all social relationships – relationship of productions, family 
relationship, sexual relationships, etc. Mechanism of power, according to Foucault, is “where 
and how, between whom, between what points, according to what processes, and with what 
effects, power is applied”. In Foucault’s opinion, a mechanism of power is intrinsic to a social 
relationship, serving as both the effect of the relationship and the cause of that relationship 
(Foucault, 2007: 2). These ideas suggest that a definition of two dimensions of power reveals 
that power (of any type) can always be found in social relationships. For this analysis, a power 
relationship is in essence a common social relationship, but by addressing it with a prefix 
“power”, this paper focuses on what kind of power lies in that relationship, how power operates 
in that relationship, and how that relationship shapes the power being exercised in that 
relationship. Although simple, “power relationship” is a vital concept in studying about power. 
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Foucault’s interpretation of power and mechanism of power is that both concepts are not self-
generated (Foucault, 2007: 2). They support each other: power is enforced by mechanisms of 
power in social relationships, and the enforced power ensures sustained mechanisms of power. 
Power relationships are what power relies on to take effects and enhance itself. They are 
incarnations of power. Delving into the mechanism of power out from social relationships is 
an effective method to study about power. 
 “Domination” is a word frequently associated with power. Weber identifies the concept 
of domination as: “probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by 
a given group of persons” (Weber, 1969: 53). Considering Weber’s definition of power, it seems 
that Weber believes domination is what power brings about. Power manifests its existence by 
creating domination. If this perspective of Weber is accepted, then domination is part of a 
“power relationship”: it is a characteristic of power relationship that demonstrates existence 
and operations of power. Henceforth, “domination” is defined as: all phenomena in a power 
relationship that the actor with greatest power deploys the power to influence the social system.  
Now, a taxonomy of the two basic types of power in this research as well as their important 
attributes can be outlined. See table 1.  
However, before proceeding, two other concepts should be introduced: authority and trust. 
“Trust” serves as an important motivation in making choices, especially for consumers on a 
housing market. As products on housing markets are always expensive and have long duration, 
a wrong pick-up can cause a consumer to pay a high opportunity cost. As a result, customers 
on housing markets are often extraordinarily picky. A provider of products on the investment 
market must make himself trustworthy enough to entice the customers to pick his product. 
Coleman’s work implies that the mechanism of trust is based on the rational calculations of 
personal utilities: it is like placing a bet, the actor decides on how much might be lost, how 
much might be gained, and the chance of winning. When the estimated gain (a product of the 
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chance of winning and the amount one could gain) outweighs the potential loss (a product of 
the chance of losing and the amount that might be lost), the actor as trustor would choose to 
trust the trustee (Coleman, 1990: 99). Consequently, a product provider who wants to become 
a trustee of consumers may utilize some strategies to manipulate customers’ estimations on the 
variables defining potential gains and losses. This is a useful perspective when studying a 
housing market. 
 
 
Authority is introduced here because it is a role that the Chinese state plays in the housing 
market. Weber sees “authority” as “legitimate domination” (Weber: 215), where legitimate can 
be explained as “the probability that to a relevant degree the appropriate attitudes will exist and 
the corresponding practical conduct ensured” (ibid: 213). This definition of legitimating can be 
Table 1 A taxonomy of two types of power in this research 
Type of power Governmental power Transactional power 
Orientation 
Vertical (the dominating side 
establishes complete or partial 
control on the dominated side's 
actions) 
Horizontal (the dominating side influences 
mainly the system and the dominated side 
retains full control on his actions) 
Deployment of 
power 
Could be considered as unilateral, 
as dominated side usually cannot 
establish control on the dominating 
side in return 
Bilateral (a one-to-one relationship) or 
multilateral (in a whole system), as it is an 
attribute that all actors in a system have 
Domain that the 
power applies for 
Governance - the vertical domain Market - the horizontal domain 
Power's deployer in 
the context of 
research topic 
The state The providers of products on the market 
Type of power 
relationship that the 
power lies in 
The state's governmental behaviors 
on the objects of governance: 
regulations, sanctions, interferes, 
prohibitions, etc. 
The trades on the market, especially processes 
for the actors to meet agreements for conducting 
transactions 
Appearance of 
domination 
The state forces its objects to obey 
its will 
The providers of products use their advantage of 
controlling more resources to set values in the 
transactional systems, hence further influence 
the choices of customers in the future 
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explained as “being accepted and followed”. Therefore, Weber’s authority can be considered 
as “power being exercised with the acceptance and cooperation of others.” James Coleman 
reaches a similar definition of authority, yet his definition is more adaptable with versatile 
situations when compared with Weber’s definition. Coleman first identifies the concept of 
“rights” as: all individuals that would be affected by an act accept that act without dispute 
(Coleman, 1990: 50); then defines authorities as power elites’ rights to control the action of 
other individuals, formed by other individuals transferring some of their rights to the power 
elites (ibid: 66). Hence, Coleman’s definition of authorities also implies “controlling the action 
of others with their acceptance”. Nevertheless, Coleman provides more discussions on 
authority relations and authority systems from an actor’s perspective. For instance, Coleman 
points out that if the power of an authority is hard to divest, actors may try to escape from the 
authority or disobey it (ibid: 70). A state, according to Coleman, is exactly an authority that is 
hard to have its power divested. Theories of authorities help in observing interactions between 
the people and the state. 
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3. Research question and model of analysis 
 
3.1 Research question and outline of the model 
 
With the conceptual framework constructed in the last chapter, I define the core research 
question for this research as follows: 
 
What are the features of key power relationships in the Chinese housing market that the 
customers find themselves in? 
 
“Housing market” in this research is limited to the scope of urban China. In fact, this scope 
is defined according to a fact that markets in which residence developments in urban and rural 
China take remarkably different forms, which is based on the division of two types of land 
ownership (Li & Gibson, 2014). Synonyms of “housing market” in Chinese (fangshi [house 
market], loushi [building market], dichan shichang [real estate market], etc.) appear mostly in 
urban contexts and rarely appear in rural contexts in PRC. Therefore, the scope of this research 
is defined as urban China only. 
By defining two domains above, it is easy to know that the “key power relationships” refer 
to the two relationships that the customers have to deal with: the relationship between the state 
and the customers and the relationship between the developers and the customers. Referring to 
the dualities of horizontal and vertical, politic and economy, the two power relationships are at 
the origin of great disadvantages that customers have to confront in the Chinese housing market. 
For the purpose of discussing the two power relationships in depth, I construct a model of 
analysis to explain the positions of the actors and their connections in the Chinese housing 
market. As this research concentrates on the perspective of the customers, I call this model a 
“dual-domination model”, as the customers are dominated – being restrained by the effects of 
power – in two power relationships at the same time. Inspiration of this model comes from a 
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“power triad” model contributed by Anton Oleinik (2011) in his studies on delimited spaces of 
transactions in the Russian markets. Oleinik’s model is constructed on the basis of a bilateral 
power relationship in a market – a transaction, or a trade – where A, the principal, exercises his 
power over B, the agent. Oleinik adds a third actor C into the model. C is an actor able to create 
a delimited space of transaction, and puts the bilateral power relationship of A-B into that 
delimited space he created. C would then put control on access to the delimited transaction 
space (which leads to label C as “the gatekeeper” in the triad). By controlling the access to the 
transactional space, C attains domination over A; and by dominating A, C further achieves 
domination over B (Oleinik 2011: 154-156). The power triad model fits to the situation of the 
Chinese housing market, as the following correspondence can be found: C, the holder of 
transcendental power, is the Chinese state; A, the dominating side in the original transaction, 
finds its equivalent in the residence developers in the Chinese housing market, who hold more 
resources and information in general; B, the actor that found at the end of the domination chains, 
finds its counterpart in the customers in the Chinese housing market, apparently. Therefore, if 
the power triad model is applied on the Chinese housing market, the three power relationships 
in the triad are as follows:  
Actor A on actor B (A-B): transactions between the developers and the customers; namely 
sales of residences by the developers to the customers;  
Actor C on actor A (C-A): the control of the state on real-estate developers;  
Actor C on actor B (C-B): aside from the indirect influence of the state on the customers 
by regulating developers, the state also directly regulates the customers in many ways.  
Hence, the “dual-domination” in my model refers to the power relationships C-B and A-
B in the power triad. In fact, the “dual-domination” model can be considered as a reinterpreted 
Oleinik’s power triad model, applying a perspective from the position of actor B (in the reality, 
the customers in the Chinese housing market). I do not directly use “power triad” because 
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limitations of the data (see chapter 4) make detailed discussions on the power relationship C-
A hard to conduct. However, the C-A relationship does exist in the space of transaction (the 
housing market) and can sometimes be seen in analyses below. 
 
3.2 The three actors: definition in details 
 
In this part I define the three actors to show how I apply my model to the Chinese housing 
market. All three “actors” (the state, the developer, and the customer) in the model of analysis 
are in fact personifications of collections of actors who play a respectively similar roles in the 
interactions within the delimited transaction space of the Chinese housing market. In this regard, 
the three “actors” are actually three categories of actors. Similar attributes can be found in the 
actors who belong to a same category.  
 
3.2.1. The state  
The Chinese state is composed of numerous institutions and agents that together form a 
hierarchy. In this research, actors who are seen serving this hierarchy in the data may be defined 
as the “state” category. An actor of the state category can be an individual working for the state, 
like a bureaucrat or an office spokesperson; that actor can also be an institution, an office, a 
committee, or a body of any other type, within the hierarchy of the state. Actors have an 
additional requirement to be defined as “the state” category: he/it is seen deploying his/its 
position in the hierarchy and exercising power that he/it is endowed with by holding that 
position. This additional criterion applies even if the actor carries out an action that does not 
favors the interest of hierarchy or the state with the power; for example, rent seeking behaviors.  
Unlike the cases with “developers” and “customers”, actors on different levels or in 
different sub-systems of the hierarchy of state may confront remarkably varied situations. 
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Therefore, actors of the category “state” fall further into subtypes. In this research, I consider 
three subtypes of the “state” actors vital to be distinguished for following analyses. 
The first subtype is the “high-levels” (gaoceng). This subtype is composed by institutions, 
committees, offices, and other types of political bodies of national level, and also prominent 
political figures working in these political bodies. Political bodies and figures of this type are 
mostly found in the system of CCP (Central Committee of CPC, Central Politburo of CPC, etc.) 
or in the government system of PRC (namely the State Council of PRC and its subsidiary 
ministries). As discussed before, actors of “high-level” subtype no longer interact directly with 
developers and customers after reforms in the housing sector of PRC. Instead, they issue 
regulations and commands to agents on lower levels of the hierarchy. Discourses of the “high-
levels” are effective nationwide, and therefore actors of the developer type and of the customer 
type usually treat voices of high-levels as harbingers of transitions on the market. 
The second subtype is “low level executive branches”, or the “executive” (xingzheng) type. 
This subtype refers to the local governments and their agents, and hence can also be labeled 
simply as “governments” (zhengfu). As previous discussions suggest, actors of executive type 
perform most transactions with developers and customers among all agents in the state 
hierarchy. In the housing market, their primary tasks are execution of the policies issued by the 
“high-levels”, which is usually done by carrying out detailed regulations against transactions 
on the market within designated geographical scopes. They are also the “state” type actors who 
directly transact with developers in the production of housing market supply, being in charges 
of city planning, land requisitions, and land transfers. Occasionally, they also serve as executors 
of sanctions on actors that trespass legal boundary of choices drawn by the state.  
The third subtype of the state category is “judicial branches”, the “judicial” (sifa) for short. 
This subtype is composed by judicial branches of the state, namely courts and judges from all 
levels of the state hierarchy. Voices of judicial actors are most authentic and verifiable proofs 
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that the legal boundary drawn by the state is in effect and hard to trespass. 
 
3.2.2. The developers  
“Developers”, of course, refers to the actors who develop the real-estates sold on the 
Chinese housing market. Currently in urban China, most development of residences are 
performed by large real-estate companies. Real-estate firms purchase pieces of land (rights of 
using those pieces of land to be precise) from local governments, then construct “microdistricts” 
on those pieces of land, and in the end organize the sales of completed microdistricts. Hence 
they are also builders and sellers at the same time. Sometimes the large real-estate companies 
do not manage the construction and/or marketing works directly, but establish and fund small 
branches and let these branches take over the works. In this research, I define “developer” as 
both real-estate firms in charge of production and sales of residences and their agents (clerks 
or branch companies). Nevertheless, the mostly often seen “developer” type actors in the data 
are still the large real-estate companies that are ultimate supervisors of the construction and 
marketing of residences. Hence, if there are no particular references, the word “developers” in 
this dissertation refers to those large real-estate companies.  
Some real-estate companies in China are state-owned, or have shares held by the state. 
State-owned real-estate companies are not only owned but also managed by the state, as the 
state has power to appoint and fire executives of these companies. These executives are also 
mostly cadres, who have worked and will work for party-state apparatuses (Paik, 2014). 
Nevertheless, since the state-owned real-estate companies act as builders and sellers of 
residences rather than administrative apparatuses on the Chinese housing market, I identify 
these state-owned real-estate enterprises and their agents as “developers” instead of “the state”. 
“Brokers”, companies and individuals who profit by selling residences to customers but are not 
involved in production of the residences, are excluded from “developers” in this research due 
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to methodological considerations. Including these secondary sellers of products into the model 
may introduce at least another two power relationships (broker-developers and broker-
customers). To discuss these power relationships would require a considerable amount of new 
data, which can be hard to collect.  
 
3.2.3. The customers  
Just as this word suggests, “customers” in the Chinese housing market are investors or 
intentional investors of residences. To simplify the analysis model, the scope of “customers” 
in this research is limited to individuals whose intentions are to purchase new residences as 
properties that they can legally own. In other words, they have to meet the following 
requirements: they go after only new products, not second-handed estates; they want to obtain 
legal ownerships of the properties, not just temporary rights of using the properties (like in 
cases of renting or leasing).  
 
Now, after basic descriptions of the three actors it should be easy to understand graphs I 
drew that show the structure of the dual-domination model. See figure 2: 
Figure 2 The structure of the dual-domination model 
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4. Methodology and data 
 
4.1 Choice of method 
 
For this research, I chose to use the method of content analysis on second-hand data, 
including housing advertisements and news reports, to carry out my analysis. In comparison 
with first-hand data, second-hand data has a significant advantage in availability from distance, 
which offsets the biggest limitation on finishing this research: the time. For a master student 
who has only approximately one year for this dissertation, collecting first-handed data seemed 
to be unfeasible, as it required me to return to China and spend considerable time on fieldworks 
in order to gather enough information for the research. Second-hand data, in contrast, can be 
easily reached from the internet. Henceforth, using second-hand data became a preferable 
choice for me. By using second-hand data, I did not need to return to China for data collection, 
which saved me a great amount of time. To utilize the second-hand data, I chose the method of 
content analysis, which is a great method to discover correlations among the fragmented 
information contained in housing advertisements and news reports.  
My content analysis includes two parts, with each part referring to one of the two major 
power relationships in the dual-domination model. For the A-B power relationship (developers-
customers), the content analysis is carried out on selling advertisements of legally developed 
microdistricts. I chose advertisements as a source of data primarily because they are the most 
common materials relevant to this power relationship that can be collected online. They are 
also qualified as data; according to Bourdieu, advertisements are used by real-estate firms as 
“weapons of symbolic campaigns”, in which campaigns the firms want to mitigate the potential 
gap between the products as actually supplied and perceived and the expectation of that product. 
(Bourdieu, 2005: 54) That is to say, designs of advertisements are influenced by the customers’ 
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expectations on the products, which means that the advertisements reflect mechanisms of 
interactions between the developers and the customers latently.  
Content analysis for C-B relationship (state-customer) is done on news reports. News 
reports as a source of data are very easy to collect, thanks to the fact that actors in this power 
relationship are commonly seen in reports. Yet, to do content analysis with reports, I have to 
be aware of the nature of reports. Information in news reports may not always be objective, 
comprehensive, and neutral; quite often, attitudes of reporters and editors may distort or 
conceal some facts. Information in the reports that shows primarily not facts but preferences of 
reporters and editors may depict distorted realities. Therefore, my strategy is concerning only 
information about established facts in the reports while ignoring voices that comment, 
speculate, or predict the facts. My analysis is conducted only with facts retrieved from the data 
after such screening. 
 
4.2 Data Collection 
 
My data collection began with delimiting the scope of research. Nationwide ranges like 
“in China” and “Chinese housing market” are far too vast to be “doable”. Eventually I chose 
Beijing, the capital of the country, and Wuhan, the largest city in central China, as the sample 
cities. I have lived in both cities for several years respectively, which gives me some basic 
knowledge about landscapes of both metropolitans. The two cities vary in political, economic, 
and social statuses. Beijing is recognized as a “first tier city” (yixian chengshi) in China. Being 
the capital of the country, it has abundant political resources that no other city in China can 
rival, and is considered to have one of the most optimistic economic growth expectancies in 
China. Wuhan is a “second tier city” (erxian chengshi), the capital of Hubei province, and the 
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largest city in central China12. Due to relatively lower regional competitiveness, Wuhan’s 
economic condition is less favorable than Beijing. The two cities’ differences helps in spotting 
commonalities among features of housing markets in the two cities, avoiding too much regional 
particularity in analysis results.  
Alongside with narrowing down the geographical scope to sample cities, I also limited the 
time range. I found that the amount of data in a given year suffices in supporting my analysis, 
so I determined to define the time scope of my research in one single year. I eventually chose 
the year 2013. This year was relatively close to the time when I was planning this research 
(2015), and many microdistricts sold on the market in 2013 were still on sale by 2015, which 
guaranteed availability of advertisements as data. Yet it was also not the “last year” for 2015, 
which means that I may gather some other information that requires sometime to be produced, 
annual statistics for instance, if I needed. Collection of data was conducted completely online 
while I stayed in Canada. For the collection of news reports, I relied on search engines. I chose 
Baidu (www.baidu.com), a major mainland Chinese search engine, as a most preferred tool of 
finding news reports. Google was not my first choice because searching results using Google 
contains reports published by overseas Chinese language media. I considered reports conducted 
in mainland Chinese society to be the most relevant choices as data because they reflect the 
context of the mainland Chinese society best. Therefore, my plan of collecting news reports as 
data was “mainland reports first, overseas reports as supplements”. Later I found that news 
reports by media based in (as well as have the majority of their audiences in) PRC already 
contains enough information, and henceforth I did not collect overseas reports. 
Baidu has a function of news search similar with the Google’s one that can be accessed 
from Canada. Reports I looked for are of relevant topics, and first published in reliable media 
in 2013. In regards to geographical relevance, all reports collected are either about events 
                                                 
12 “Central China” usually refers to the three Chinese provinces Henan, Hubei, and Hunan. Sometimes the provinces Jiangxi 
and Anhui is also included. Wuhan remains as the most populous city in either scopes.  
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happened in or affecting at least one of the two sample metropolitans, or about situations that 
occurred all over the country or will have nationwide effects. With these criteria, I collected a 
total of 175 reports. The cases are numbered with an “N” prefix (standing for “news”), from 
N01 to N175.  
The advertisements as data were also collected online. Many Chinese websites offer 
information about microdistricts on sale in major Chinese cities. Most of them cooperate with 
the developers: the developers pay the websites and have the websites to show advertisements 
of microdistricts they developed online. The websites where I obtain most materials are Leju 
(house.sina.com.cn) and Jiaodian (www.focus.cn) because they typically provide the most 
amount of information of microdistricts on sold. At the same time, I also consulted other 
Chinese real-estate websites (including Soufang [www.fang.com], Yifang [www.fdc.com.cn], 
Tengxun fangchan [house.qq.com], Wangyi fangchan [house.163.com], and etc., all of which 
are accessible in Canada) to find more information about microdistricts on sold that are not 
recorded by Leju and Jiaodian. With the “city selection” function provided by nearly every 
real-estate website, it was easy to find microdistricts on sale in the two cities. In terms of the 
delimited scope of time, I looked at marketing history of every microdistrict I found. 
Microdistricts in China today are often developed and sold in multiple phases; in each phase, 
some residential blocks among all planned blocks are built and put onto market. Information 
of most microdistrict I found contain several dates of “beginning of sales of a new phase”. If 
the earliest date among these “beginning sale dates” of a microdistrict was after the year 2013, 
that microdistrict was dropped; if the latest “beginning sale date” was in 2011 or earlier, that 
microdistrict was also dropped, since that microdistrict may had already been sold out in 2013. 
I also checked the correspondence of the descriptions of microdistricts and the phases on sale 
in 2013. If a description of a microdistrict did not match the products sold in that microdistrict 
in 2013, the microdistrict was dropped as well. After meticulous selections I collected 
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advertisements of 110 microdistricts in Beijing and 113 in Wuhan in total. The 110 cases of 
Beijing are numbered with prefix “B”, from B01 to B110; cases of Wuhan have numbers with 
prefix “W”, from W01 to W113.  
The most crucial part of the data that I recorded for microdistricts were the introductions 
or descriptions of them, which I identify as “promotional discourses”. Additionally, I also 
recorded two features of microdistricts that describes their appearances. The first feature is 
“floor space ratio” (FSR, also known as “floor area ratios”), a ratio of total covered area on all 
floors of all buildings on a certain pieces of land divided by the area of the piece of land. It 
shows the density of structures built in a delimited area. The other feature is “type of structures”, 
a description of the designs of residential structures in microdistricts. Taxonomy of structure 
type is: for all villas, they are defined as “villa” type; for apartment buildings13, they are sorted 
into “low” (mostly less than 7 floors), “medium” (mostly 8-15 floors), “high”(mostly 16-25 
floors), and “mega high” (or “mega” for short, mostly 26 or more floors), depending on the 
number of floors they have14. With each microdistrict, I recorded the type of structure that most 
residential blocks in that microdistrict belongs to. If two types of structure coexist with similar 
portions in a microdistrict, both types of structures were recorded, forming a combination of 
the two types. If apartment building and villa coexist in a microdistrict, then the type of 
structure was recorded as a combination of villa and the most prevalent type of apartment 
buildings in the microdistrict.  
The appearances of microdistricts collected as data can be roughly outlined with FSRs 
and types of structures I recorded. The distributions of structure type for the two cities are seen 
                                                 
13 “Apartment buildings” here refers to multi-story residential blocks composed by suites that could be sold for full property 
status, the mainstream form of residence sold on Chinese market. In Chinese these blocks are commonly called gongyu lou 
(“apartment building”) or jumin lou (“resident building”). Gongyu is the Chinese word commonly used as counterpart of 
“apartment” or “apartment suites” in Canada (but not translation of basement “apartment” in Newfoundland). 
14 This taxonomy is roughly based on a commonly used taxonomy of apartment buildings in Chinese: duoceng (“multiple 
floors”): usually less than 7 floors; xiao gaoceng ( “minor high floors”): commonly 7-15 floors; gaoceng (“high floors”): can 
be used for any building with more than 7 floors, but in the presence of the types xiao gaoceng and chaogaoceng, mostly 
with 15-30 floors; chaogaoceng (“super high floors” or “mega high floors”): usually with more than 30 floors.  
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in table 2, which table shows that Beijing’s microdistricts collected as cases have medium 
height apartment buildings (about 7-15 floors) as the most prevalent type of structure, while in 
Wuhan the most popular type is the mega type (over 25 floors).  
 
Table 2 Distribution of structure type of all microdistricts as cases 
Beijing 
Structure types 
Wuhan 
Frequency Total percent Frequency Total percent 
8 7.3% Villa 3 2.7% 
11 10.0% Low 2 1.8% 
2 1.8% Low/Villa 1 0.9% 
4 3.6% Low/Medium / / 
34 30.9% Medium / / 
2 1.8% Medium/Villa 3 2.7% 
7 6.4% Medium/High 6 5.3% 
31 28.2% High 23 20.4% 
5 4.5% High/Villa 11 9.7% 
/ / High/Low 3 2.7% 
5 4.5% Mega 37 32.7% 
/ / Mega/Villa 5 4.4% 
/ / Mega/Low 5 4.4% 
1 0.9% Mega/Medium 2 1.8% 
/ / Mega/High 12 10.6% 
 
For FSR, I divided the range of value into seven intervals, then drew bar charts of FSR 
distributions on these intervals in the two sample cities. Generally, the higher or denser the 
residential structures in a microdistricts are, the greater the FSR of that microdistrict. According 
to my data, a contemporary Chinese microdistrict that is only composed of villas usually has a 
FSR around 1, while a microdistrict with all blocks in “mega” structure type typically has an 
FSR between 3.5 and 4. The bar charts are presented in figure 3.1 and 3.2, which reveal that 
most microdistricts as cases collected from Beijing have FSRs between 1.5 and 3, while in 
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Wuhan a considerable proportion of those cases have FSRs above 3. Nevertheless, in both cities, 
only less than 20 cases are seen having FSR lower than 1.5. This indicates that villas are limited 
in supply indeed in both cities, while apartment blocks of medium-high structure type or higher 
Figure 3.1 Distribution of floor space ratios of microdistricts sold in Beijing, 2013, as cases collected in my data 
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of floor space ratios of microdistricts sold in Wuhan, 2013, as cases collected in my data 
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compose mainstreams of products supplied on housing markets in both metropolitan. This 
phenomenon in designs of contemporary Chinese microdistricts is critical for understanding 
some of my analyses in chapter 6 below. 
 
4.3 Coding and analysis 
 
I conducted my content analysis with the help of the software QDA Miner. I created three 
projects: one for news reports, one for advertisements collected from Beijing, and one for 
advertisements collected from Wuhan. The advertisements were not put together to prevent the 
project from becoming too large, thus making coding and information retrieving challenging. 
QDA miner does not fully support Chinese as a language. It cannot automatically count Chinese 
words or split Chinese sentences, and even cannot show Chinese characters properly when 
contents written in Chinese are highlighted, which is disruptive for coding specific contents. 
My solution for locating contents was splitting all sentences in my data manually and have 
each sentence to occupy a separate row. Other functions that cannot work for Chinese, such as 
counting words, sentences, or paragraphs, were avoided in my analysis.  
Two code books were created for the two types of data, with the two advertisement 
projects sharing the same code book. The codes were identified on the basis of my impressions 
on the contents of data during the data collection as well as some of my expectations of analysis, 
with some adjustments made in the later process of coding (mostly creation of new codes for 
topics that frequently reoccur in the data but were not included in my codebooks by that time). 
Since the number of cases in all three projects exceed 100, I found in my early coding process 
that using simple codes cause information searching with content retrieving very challenging. 
Consequently, I decided to place the codes in each codebook under two different categories, 
with each category representing an aspect of a strategy of action. When searching for texts with 
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specific types of contents, I conduct cross retrieving of multiple relevant codes to locate those 
contents.  
In the codebook for news reports, the two categories are “subjects”, referring to the actors 
that take specific actions, and “objects”, referring to the targets of those actions. The actors are 
the state, the developers, and the customers defined for this research. I split the state into “high 
level”, “executive branches”, and “judicial branches” in the code book. On the “target” side, I 
identify the most important orientations of targets in this research as “benefit customers” and 
“restraint customers”. Additionally, I defined “benefit developers” and “restraint developers” 
as targets, since developers also frequently show up in the data. I also added a “hierarchical” 
code for actors of the state type, applies to their actions that deal with agents of the state on 
other levels. Finally, along with codes in the two categories, I created a code for descriptions 
of market conditions in the reports that are not explicitly shown to be caused by actions of any 
actor. For a complete list of code for news reports and their descriptions, see Table 3.  
 The two categories in the code book of advertisements are “topics” and “themes”. 
“Topics” stand for explicit, external attributes of the products; “themes” are some latently 
identified attributes of the residences, constructed by promotion discourses as techniques of 
appealing clients and representing what the developers want customers to believe the products 
to be. In other words, topics are reflections of realities and themes are indications of intentions 
of the developers. I identify eight codes in “topics” category and six codes in “themes” category. 
For a complete list of code for advertisements and their descriptions, see Table 4. 
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Code category Code name Description 
Subjects State-High level Actions or discourses of political bodies (institutions, 
organizations, committees, etc.) or agents on the national level of 
the state hierarchy. 
State-Government Actions or discourses of lower level executional branches of the 
Chinese state or of agents of those branches. 
State-Judiciary Actions or discourses of juridical branches of the Chinese state 
or of agents of those branches. 
Customers Actions or discourses of the customers. 
Developers Actions or discourses of the developers. 
Objects Benefit Customers Actions or discourses with intentions or effects of enriching the 
customers' benefits or enlarging their freedom of choice. This 
code applies to situations where customers try to enhance their 
own benefits. 
Restrain Customers Actions or discourses with intentions or effects of reducing the 
customers' ranges of choice and/or benefits. This code applies to 
situations where the customers’ behaviors turn out to restrict or 
harm themselves eventually. 
Benefit Developers Actions or discourses with intentions or effects of enriching the 
developers' benefits or enlarging their freedom of choice. This 
code applies to situations where developers try to enhance their 
own benefits. 
Restrain Developers Actions or discourses with intentions or effects of reducing the 
developers' ranges of choice and/or benefits. This code applies to 
situations where developers’ behaviors turn out to restrict or harm 
themselves eventually. 
Hierarchical Actions or discourses of political bodies or agents with the state 
hierarchy that deal with superordinates or subordinates. 
Market Conditions Situations on the Chinese housing market (like those with supply 
or prices) being mentioned in the news reports that are not 
explicitly caused by any action of the three actors. 
Table 3 Code book used for news reports analysis 
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Code 
category 
Code name Description 
Topics Architecture Contents about designs and constructions of the microdistricts, the 
residential blocks, or the residential units.  
Location Contents about the geographical locations of the microdistricts.  
Transportation Contents about transportation facilities and services available for 
residents (present or future ones) in the microdistricts. 
Commerce Contents about shopping and/or recreational amenities in or around the 
microdistricts. 
Education Contents about educational facilities in or around microdistricts and 
programs that may be available to estate owners of microdistricts. 
Health care Contents about health care facilities in or around microdistricts or health 
services available to estate owners in microdistricts. 
Community Contents about composition of residents in the microdistrict (present or 
future, imagined or actual), or communication and interactions between 
residents in the neighborhood. 
Environment Contents about environment of microdistricts, include: natural 
landscapes, ecologies, gardens, or parks in, around, or near microdistricts; 
and natural elements can be experienced during indoor living. 
Themes Culture/Spirit 
(Culture for short) 
Contents claiming that the residences carry specific “cultures” or 
“spirits”, indicating that the customers can “live a spiritually contented 
life here”. Contents coded with “Cultural Elitism” do not have to be coded 
with this code simultaneously. 
Superiority/Scarcity 
(Superiority for short) 
Contents claiming that a microdistrict offers resources or conveniences 
that cannot be provided by other microdistricts. 
Expertise Contents in the advertisements that claim that the creation of the product 
is under the guidance of professional knowledge and skills, including 
claims about using certain concepts in the designs but does not directly 
claims any spiritual benefits of them (otherwise will be coded with 
Culture/Spirit).  
Customized Contents in the advertisement that indicate some aspects of the products 
fit to, especially “being made to fit to”, the needs of customers. 
Social Elitism Contents indicate that owners of estates in this microdistrict, present or 
future ones, are or can become political elites, economical elites, or elites 
without specifications. 
Cultural Elitism Contents in advertisements that indicate that owners of estates in this 
microdistrict, present or future ones, are superior or can be superior than 
other social members on the features like erudite, cultured, intelligent, 
elegant, or well-educated; or claim that microdistricts provide cultural 
spheres, spirits or tastes associated with superior tastes. 
Table 4 Code book used for housing advertisements analysis 
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5. State over customers: straightforward interference 
 
Although the Chinese state has withdrawn some of its power from the housing sector, the 
state will still have decisive effects on the interactions between the two actors in this highly 
one-sided power relationship today. This chapter discusses how the state exercise power over 
the customers, which can be easily illustrated by retrieved contents from the data. Please notice 
that I use one quotation to support each argument in this chapter only to reduce the length of 
this dissertation. In fact, most arguments in this chapter can be supported by multiple cases in 
the data. 
 
5.1. Strategy of the state: two approaches of enforcing equality 
 
On February 20th, 2013, Wen Jiaobao15, then prime minister of PRC, hosted an executive 
meeting of the State Council (guowuyuan changwu huiyi). At the meeting, the state explicitly 
expressed a will for enforcing equality: 
 
…The meeting points out: our country is experiencing rapid urbanization in recent period, 
tension between supply and demand of residences in hot point cities {redian chengshi, means 
cities popular for real-estate investors}16 is hard to be changed on the level of fundamental 
causes {hard to be alleviated by solving fundamental problems}. Supporting demands of self-
residing {zizhu xuqiu, means customers purchasing residences to accommodate themselves} 
and suppressing speculative investments on residences are fundamental policies that controls 
on real-estate market have to adhere to. (N94) 
 
I describe the motivations of the state as “to enforce equality” because the state’s voices 
shown here notably favors customers with lower socioeconomic status. “Self-residing” are 
                                                 
15 Unless specifically identified, all Chinese names in this paper are written in the order in Chinese: the family name is 
placed before the given name. 
16 In quotations of this dissertation, I use square brackets “[]” to identify ideas that are not covered in original Chinese texts 
(mostly due to grammar differences), curly brackets “{}” as notations of contents, and parentheses “()” only where 
parentheses are used in original contents. 
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commonly seen among social groups with lower socioeconomic conditions; meanwhile the 
speculators, the group that the state intends to control against, are likely to possess enough 
disposable wealth to invest into residences in addition to owing residences satisfying their own 
living demands. While this appears to be a good will on the part of the state, the state’s practices 
guided by this will is not as friendly as the will itself appears to be. Analysis on my data shows 
two major approaches exploited by the state to enforce the equality it wants to bring about, 
both of which approaches are about restrictions. The first approach is to restrict the customers’ 
ability to purchase residences, most noticeable a quota-alike residence-purchase-qualification 
distribution system. The second is to directly control the prices of residences, including 
providing subsidized residences and setting up price limits for developers. This is in accordance 
with Bourdieu’s interpretation of the state’s “two-fold construction” of the housing market: a 
combination of “constructions of demands” and “constructions of supplies”. (Bourdieu, 2005: 
16) 
 
5.1.1 Purchase restrictions 
Limitations on residence purchases is shown as a long term policy of PRC in the data, had 
already been launched a few years prior to 2013: 
 
…April 2010. State Council issued Notification about Firmly Stopping Excessive Growth 
of Residence Prices in Some Cities {guanyu jianjue ezhi bufen chengshi fangjia guokuai 
shangzhang de tongzhi}, [in which stated that] percentage of down payment for [financing] 
the second residence should not be less than 50%, and the interest of loan [for the second 
residence] should not be lower than 1.1 time of benchmark interest rate. Some cities with 
excessive residence prices issued “orders of purchase restriction” one after another. 
… 
January 2011. Office of the State Council issued Notification on Further Doing a Good 
Job in the Control of the Real Estate Market {guanyu jinyibu zuohao fangdichan shichang 
tiaokong gongzuo youguan wenti de tongzhi}, [in which stated that] percentage of down 
payment for [financing] the second residence should not be less than 60%, and the interest of 
loan [for the second residence] should not be lower than 1.1 time of benchmark interest rate… 
(N26) 
 
 34 
 
Therefore, in the first season of 2013, policies of restricting residence purchases were not 
something new, but something being adhered to and strengthened. Voices from the meeting of 
State Council in early 2013 identified a few techniques of purchase limitation:  
 
… [Wen] restated the three “weapons” of restricting purchases {refers to quota policies}, 
restricting loans, and property taxation… The meeting reiterated that regulating policies with 
restricting purchases and restricting loans should be continued and suppressions on 
speculative residence purchases should be insisted… (N09) 
 
This meeting marked a key point of policy transition throughout the year. Five articles as 
specific measures of regulating and controlling housing market were prescribed in the meeting, 
and were together dubbed as “national five articles” (guo wu tiao) in the media. Among the 
five articles, the second article prescribes some restrictions on residence purchases in detail: 
 
… Second, steadily suppress speculative residence purchases. Implement measures of 
restricting purchases of commercial residences rigorously. For direct-controlled municipalities, 
listed cities17, and provincial capital cities that have carried out purchase-restricting measures, 
[the city governments] should enhance the purchase-restricting measures … In other cities with 
excessive rises in prices of residences, the provincial governments should require the city 
[governments] to implement purchase-restricting measures in time. Implement differentiated 
policies on residential credits rigorously. Enlarge the range of “experimental units” {having 
experiments carried out in more cities} of private-residences-property-taxation reformations. 
(N94) 
 
“National five articles” served as instructions given by the central government that were 
expected to be followed by low level executive branches. Chinese government offices on 
national level actually gave deadlines to city governments: 
 
…There are not many days left before the deadline that Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development (known as MOHURD hereinafter 18 ) gave to local governments to 
formulate detailed plans of executing “national five articles”; yet [governments of] megacities 
like Beijing and Shanghai appear as still “waiting and seeing”. 
“Our request to local governments is to introduce detailed plans of local executions of 
‘national five articles’ before end of March.” An official of MOHURD who did not want to be 
                                                 
17 Jihua danlie shi (“cities separately listed in the plans”), refers to five large non-provincial-capital cities in China: Dalian, 
Qingdao, Ningbo, Xiamen, and Shenzhen. As important sea ports and industrial centers, these cities enjoy sub-provincial 
treatments in administrative system and have larger discretions in local economic affairs than regular prefecture-level cities. 
18 Abbreviation is used in the original report. 
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named said in the afternoon of March 20th…(N10) 
 
In Wuhan, not much actions were taken by local governments, as existing regulations and 
policies in Wuhan by that time were believed by the city government to meet most requirement 
proposed by national government: 
 
…Reporter acknowledged from housing management bureau yesterday [March 1st, 2013] 
that many policies mentioned by detailed rules19 of the “national five articles” have already 
be implemented in Wuhan. Nonetheless, some existing policies will be upgraded with 
introduction of new detailed rules. (N138) 
 
What policies were already launched on the Wuhan housing market at the beginning of 
the year 2013 then? Data shows that numeral limits on citizens’ residence ownership was 
implemented in Wuhan no later than 2009: 
 
…In 2009, this residence at Zhoujiadawan was designated for demolition {chaiqian} too. 
Chen Jinfeng chose two small suites as “returned residences” 20… But when she was going 
through procedures on the second suite of returned residence, she was told that she was subject 
to purchase limitation policies because she already owned two residences when counting her 
first returned residence: she also had {owned} a pingfang {single floor bungalow} of 22.84 
square meters under her name, at Building No.75, 50 Xudong Road, Wuchang district… (N131) 
 
Also, an upgrade in purchase restriction policies is noted to happen in 2011 in Wuhan: 
 
… During late February of 2011, Wuhan implemented the “order of purchase restriction”, 
[from that time] if one with household registration {hukou} in other places want to purchase 
residence in Wuhan, he needs to provide verification for [local] taxation or pension fund 
{shebao} payment for longer than 1 year.… (N152) 
 
Case N152 shows that household registration (hukou)21 information was also engaged in 
                                                 
19 The “detailed rules” here refers to explanations of “national five articles” issued by the central government, e.g. the State 
Council. It shares the same original Chinese word with “detailed plans” in previous quotations: “xize”. To distinguish the 
local level and the national level, I use “detailed plans” to refer to policies issued by local governments. 
20 “Huan jian fang” (“construct in-return houses”) in original report. This is a type of residences sold with low prices as 
compensations for residences whose original dwellings are demolished for spaces of urban constructions – similar to 
“settling residences” and “relocating residences” mentioned above. 
21 In the rest of this dissertation, I use “household” only when the contents are referring to actual households. Otherwise, for 
all contents about household registration status, I simply use “hukou”. Households, or nuclear families in precise, are the 
basic units used for calculations of numbers of residence purchased. 
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definition of residence purchase eligibilities in Wuhan in the year 2013. Similar restriction on 
“hukou registered elsewhere” customers also could be seen in the other sample city, Beijing. 
And in Beijing, this restriction is even more severe: 
 
…According to the residence purchase restriction policies issued by the [city government 
of] Beijing on February 17th, 2011, people who have hukou not in Beijing need to provide proof 
of payments of tax or pension fund in Beijing for 5 consecutive years… (N09) 
 
Existence of quota policies in Beijing can be dated back to at least 2010. Quota policies 
in Beijing are also discriminative toward customers with non-local hukou registrations: 
 
…April 2010 … Some cities with excessive residence prices issued “orders of purchase 
restriction” one after another. For instance, Beijing prescribes that: sales of residences to 
households registered in Beijing are suspended; those households registered not in Beijing but 
have paid pension funds or income taxes in Beijing for [equal to or more than] 5 consecutive 
years can purchase utmost 1 residence each… (N26) 
 
Albeit much restrictions had been placed in Beijing’s housing market, the data show that 
the city government still made some adjustments on purchase restriction policies as a follow-
up to the State Council’s February 20th meeting. The new measures of Beijing show that the 
city government begin to set up restrictions on the basis of marital status of the customers: 
 
…On [March] 30th, city government of Beijing issued “Notification of Implementing State 
Council’s Real-estate Market Regulations, Notification of Further Improving Local Real-estate 
Market Regulations”22 …Starting from March 31st, single adults having hukou registered in 
Beijing who do not own a residence in Beijing are limited to purchase one residence each; for 
those [single adults having hukou registered in Beijing] who owns one or more residences in 
Beijing, sales of residences in Beijing to them are suspended…(N11) 
 
The State Council’s meeting, the “national five articles”, and subsequent upgrades of 
policies in major cities became a hot spot in the news. That was the first time in the year 2013 
that policies of housing market regulation became a focus of the media attention. There were 
                                                 
22 The original report lists two names of notification here in the quotations marks, separated by a comma. It is likely that this 
is a mistake made on: “city government of Beijing issued a notification of implementing State Council’s real-estate market 
regulations, ‘Notification of Further Improving Local Real-estate Market Regulations’…” 
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two periods throughout the year 2013 that policies of housing market regulations became hot 
spots in the media; the second one was close to the end of that year, during which period new 
interpretations and intensifications on housing market regulation policies appeared prevalently 
all over the country. Upgrades of policies at the end of the year were not shown as a result of 
new instructions given by the “high level”, but as a consequence of spontaneous actions of the 
local governments. Incentives of the city governments were similar: to finish their annual work 
plans. According to the data, the annual work plans of city governments used the prices of 
residences as a major index: 
 
…the end of the year is pending23; in the wake of constant rising in residence prices, 
whether or not [local governments of] each place24 could achieve their goals of residence 
price control that they formulated in early 2013 has become a focal point of all social circles’ 
attentions. According to latest statistics of Nation Bureau of Statistics, number of cities where 
residence prices raised by 10% (vs SPLY)25 reached 14. On this [statistic result], many experts 
and insiders of real-estate industry consider that “some cities cannot achieve their annual 
goals of residence price control” is already a foregone conclusion… (N105) 
 
The state seems to consider that putting limitations on customer’s purchases contributes 
to controlling rises in residence prices. A confirmation can be found in the second article of the 
“national five articles” quoted above: 
 
…In other cities with excessive rises in prices of residences, the provincial governments 
should require the city [governments] to implement purchase-restricting measures in time… 
(N94) 
 
Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that local regulations were also developed by 
cities across China. In Late November, Wuhan moved to adopt its own policies in line with 
several other cities: 
 
                                                 
23 Translation of this sentence follows the composition and order of words in the original Chinese sentence.  
24 “Gedi” (“every place”) in original report. In Chinese, this word is a pronoun used to emphasize the places that compose 
the conceptual set of “every place” as the subjects.  
25 Abbreviation of “versus same period last year”. Originally “tongbi”, a statistical method frequently used in China: 
comparing statistics at one time point to statistics of one year ago. 
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…Following “Shen eight articles”, “Jing seven articles”, “Hu seven articles”26, [city 
government of] Wuhan officially launched Work Advices about Further Reinforce Regulation 
and Control on Real-estate Market (abbreviated as Advice hereinafter)27 on November 22nd in 
order to quell down the real-estate market. 
Advice prescribes: for residents with hukou registered out of Wuhan [who want to] apply 
for purchasing residences [in Wuhan], the required amount of years of paying taxes or pension 
funds (assured insurance)28 in Wuhan is changed from 1 year, as in previous prescriptions, to 
2 years; furthermore, [these residents] are restricted to purchase 1 set of residence (new or 
used) only. (N114) 
 
In the meantime, Beijing reiterated the importance of adhering to purchase restriction 
policies, and expressed an attitude of implementing restriction policies more seriously. Actions 
were taken by government of Beijing earlier than those taken in Wuhan: 
 
On October 23rd, city government of Beijing launched the widely concerned “Jing seven 
articles” (Opinions about Accelerating Constructions of Medium-low Priced, Self-residing, 
Improving Type Residences29). On the day before the launch of these policies, National Bureau 
of Statistics published residence price indexes of 70 middle and large cities, [which shows that] 
real-estates in Beijing lead [price rises on the markets] nationwide with a price increase of 
20.6%. (N55) 
 
Beijing’s new policy did not add new requirement for the customers to purchase 
residences on the housing market. Nevertheless, it expressed explicitly the city government’s 
serious determination to implement purchase restriction policies:  
 
First,30  reinforce social inspections of [executions of residence] purchase restriction 
policies, organize [residence] purchase inspection committees, [and] punish [individuals who 
conduct] cheating purchases severely. 
Purchase inspection committees … spot check verifications of residence purchase 
                                                 
26 These “seven/eight articles” refers to local regulations on real-estate market by city markets, identified by abbreviations 
of the cities. “Shen eight articles” are regulations of Shenzhen launched on October 11th, 2013; “Jing seven articles” are 
regulations of Beijing, launched on October 23rd, 2013, as seen in quotations below; “Hu seven articles” are regulations of 
Shanghai, identified by Shanghai’s one character abbreviation “hu”, and were launched on November 8th, 2013. Similarly, 
the regulations issued by city government of Wuhan (seen here) is called as “Han seven articles” in quotations below, which 
is identified by Wuhan’s abbreviation “han”. 
27 Abbreviation is used in original report. 
28 “Fangxin bao” in original report. It is a type of medical social insurance in Wuhan. It can cover some medical fees of 
serious illnesses for citizens. The citizens are required to pay for pensions monthly for this service. 
29 “Zhong di jiawei zizhu xing gaishan xing shangpin fang” in original report, literally “middle-low priced self-residing type 
improving type commercial residence”; the three phrases of “middle-low priced” (zhong di jiawei), “self-residing type” 
(zizhu xing; can be interpreted as “the major or only residence of households/families”), “improving type” (gaishan xing; 
generally refer to average sized residences may be purchased by households/families living in small residences previously as 
improvements of life condition) are juxtaposed here. No explicit distinctions between these three types can be told by 
judging original Chinese words. I cannot find a pertinent translation, so I just translate literally. 
30 This is the content of the first article of “Jing seven articles”. 
 39 
 
eligibilities. Residence purchasers found to purchase illegally by fraudulence are added to 
black lists and prohibited to purchase residence in Beijing within 5 years; enterprises31 that 
assist [purchasers] in fraudulence have all procedures frozen in Beijing; those who alleged 
crimes32 are transferred to public security institutions33 for investigations. (N46) 
 
With information extracted from quotations above, a rough yet panoramic view of the 
purchase restriction policies in Chinese housing market is presented: quota policies (a 
maximum number of residences that a customer may purchase); restrictions when a customer’s 
purchases of residences exceed a given number (for example, harder financing); and 
discriminations on customers without local hukou registrations and/or particular marital 
statuses. In my view, these measures compose the first approach of the state’s enforcement of 
“social equality” on the housing market is: to reduce the customer’s ability, most noticeably 
eligibility, to purchase new residences. 
 
5.1.2 Controls on residence prices 
The second approach of the state to enforce equality is to directly control the prices of 
residences on the market. While the state seems to consider cutting down demands on the 
housing market – by reducing the ability of customers to purchase multiple residences – an 
indirect path toward price controls, it also practices measures to control prices directly. These 
measures, in my opinion fall in another two major subtypes.  
The first major subtype is to press the developers in order to ensure they do not sell 
residences at extravagant prices. Measures of this subtype are directly against the developers, 
to be precise; yet arguably, they indirectly bring potential profits to the customers.  
Controlling residence prices is a guiding ideology of Chinese state’s governance and is 
                                                 
31 It is not explicitly stated which type of enterprise in the original report. Presumptively it can cover enterprise of any type 
that assist customers in fraudulences. 
32 It is not explicitly stated “those” here refers to customers, enterprises, or both in original report; presumptively it means 
both. 
33 “Gong’an jiguan” in original report. This is a formal title of Chinese police forces. 
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upheld by “high level” actors. It is reflected in the “national five articles”: 
 
… First, consummate accountability of residence price stabilization. Direct-controlled 
municipalities, listed cities, and provincial capital cities except for Lhasa should, according to 
the principle of keeping residence prices [at a] stable [level], formulate and publish annual 
targets of newly-constructed commercial residence price control. Establish and consummate 
assessments and accountabilities of [governments’/officials’] works of residence price 
stabilizations. 
… 
Fifth, reinforce market inspection. Reinforce managements of pre-sales34 of commercial 
residences; strictly execute regulations of explicit mark price quotations in commercial 
residence sales; reinforce managements of enterprise credibility …. (N94) 
 
In article 1, price controls as local governments’ annual tasks are officially certified. In 
article 5, the national government’s requirement of quoting residence price explicitly may also 
serve as a means of controlling residence prices.  
In the data, measures that restrain developers in order to control residence prices are 
reflected in contents about local governances. Restraints placed on developers in the detailed 
plans of executing “national five articles” of Beijing are shown to be strict: 
 
…In terms of inspection on real-estate markets, the Notification35 requires: reinforce 
management of commercial residence sales, raise threshold of issuing commercial residence 
pre-sale permissions; for those commercial residence projects that quote prices evidently 
higher than price of deals during earlier phases of same projects or than price quoted by 
surrounding on-sale projects, and do not accept price guidance [of the government], 
temporarily do not issue permissions of pre-sale or temporarily refuse records on their sales of 
completed residences36. 
If [real-estate] developing enterprises are found to conduct illegal behaviors like leaving 
lands idle, speculating lands, hiding completed projects from selling, or artificially forcing up37 
residence prices, they are prohibited in any of following activities: land transfer bidding; new 
project loaning; public offering [securities]; refinancing; significant asset restructuring; 
financing by trust plans… (N11) 
 
                                                 
34 “Yushou” in original report. Refers to sales take place before construction of the residences are finished. It could be 
interpreted as residences being sold as futures. 
35 Refers to the notification of Beijing’s city government on executions of “national five articles”, with name most likely to 
be Notification of Further Improving Local Real-estate Market Regulations. See footnote 22 on page 36. 
36 “Xianfang xiaoshou bei’an” in original report; literally “leaving record on sales of completed [constructions] residences”. 
This is a procedure finished after deals on completed residences (“xianfang”) have been made. If the developers cannot 
finish this procedure due to legal issues, the customers can cancel the deals and ask for compensations from the customers. 
37 “Hongtai” in original report. This word represents behaviors of commodity sellers deliberately marking prices higher than 
normal level (judging by qualities of the commodities) on commodities to maximize profits, usually conducted on seller’s 
markets. 
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In the middle of the year 2013, city government of Beijing further tightened up the 
controls on the developers: 
 
…Following intensifications of real-estate pre-sale permission verifications’ severities 
that began in April, “order of price control” of Beijing was upgraded once again in these days: 
pre-sale permissions that have passed verifications of Commission of Housing and 
Development38 have a new “checkpoint” added [on their way] – to be submitted to the mayor’s 
office to be examined by Chen Gang, the vice mayor in charge [of real-estate affairs]; only 
after being examined and “ticked” [by the vice mayor that issuances of] these permissions are 
confirmed eventually… (N28) 
 
Regulations on the developers that prevent raising residence prices reappeared in the “Jing 
seven articles” in the late October: 
 
…Third, intensify price guidance, rigorously investigate projects that raise prices in 
disguises. Guide the developers to quote prices [of projects] reasonably by consulting prices 
of earlier phases [of same projects] and [other] projects in periphery; projects that quote high 
prices [and/or] prices with excessive raises and do not accept guidance of the government will 
be postponed with sales.  
… 
Sixth, reinforce market inspections; different offices [should] act jointly [to] severely 
punish illegal actions of all types. For real-estate developing enterprises found to conduct 
illegal behaviors like leaving lands idle, speculate lands, hiding completed projects from 
selling, artificially forcing up residence prices, etc., measures like prohibition of land bidding 
participations, rejection of offering loans for their new projects, intensification in 
managements of their land value-added taxations will be taken on them. (N46) 
 
In the other sample city, Wuhan, the February 20th meeting of State Council and “national 
five articles” did not bring about evident new policies that restrain the developers for the 
purpose of price control. Yet according to the data, this “calmness” in Wuhan was because the 
city government went ahead of the national government again:  
 
…What’s more, in the recent two years, for the purpose of suppressing excessive raises in 
residence prices, [city government of] Wuhan conducted “special attention and control”39 on 
high price residential plots; if a plot quote prices evidently higher than plots in periphery, then 
it cannot obtain certification of pre-sales. (N138) 
                                                 
38 An abbreviation of Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural Development. Abbreviation is used in 
the content of original case. I will continue using the same abbreviation hereinafter. 
39 “Dingkong” in original sentence. Literally “to (keep) stare on and control”. 
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Nevertheless, agents of city government of Wuhan still restated the resolution of imposing 
direct controls on the developers to prevent rise in residence prices as a response to instructions 
of the central government: 
 
…In respond to these phenomena, officials of real-estate management offices declared 
that [the government] will throw fierce punches this year once again on developers’ illegal 
actions like quoting fraudulent prices, hoarding residences as stocks, forcing up residence 
prices40, etc., and will also properly control the amount of high-price residences that enter the 
market [during the year] in order to avoid formation of “following-trend rises” in residence 
prices. (N136) 
 
Controls on the developers were also included in the late year regulation policy upgrades 
of the city government of Wuhan, “Han seven articles”: 
 
…Sixth, comprehensively reinforce market inspections. Guiding real-estate developing 
firms to quote prices reasonably; provisionally suspend issuance of pre-sale permissions for 
projects that do not accept guidance of the governments; further normalize open price 
quotations in commercial residence sales; severely investigate and sanction illegal actions 
such as hiding new plots for sales, hoarding residences as stocks, artificially forcing up 
residence prices, abetting and assisting residence purchasers to forge certificate materials and 
to attain eligibilities of residence purchases fraudulently, etc. (N166) 
 
The second subtype of direct price control measures implemented by the state is serving 
the market with cheap residences that have prescribed price maximums. An official name of 
these cheap residences has already been mentioned above: subsidized residences, or baozhang 
fang in Chinese. 
In the “national five articles”, subsidized residences show up in the fourth article: 
 
…Fourth, accelerate designs and constructions of affordable housing projects.41 Fully 
implement42 the 2013 task of affordable housing projects: finishing 4.7 million tao43, starting 
                                                 
40 “Zuo di qi jia” (“sit on the ground and raise prices”) in original sentence. This phrase means sellers quote excessive prices 
for commodities deliberately relying on their control on those commodities. 
41 This seems to be a borrowed translation; existence of official translation has not yet been confirmed. Name of this project 
in Chinese is “baozhangxing anju gongcheng” (literally “subsidized assured accommodation project”). 
42 “Luoshi” in original content. Literally “to make it fall on the ground soundly” or “to make it fall onto substantial/genuine 
implements”. 
43 A classifier in Chinese for apartment suites. “2 apartment suites” is expressed in Chinese in the (continue on next page) 
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construction of 6.3 million tao. Supporting facilities should be designed, constructed, and put 
into use simultaneously with [residences of] affordable housing projects. Consummate and 
strictly implement admittance and withdrawal systems 44 , ensure equality of distributions. 
Before the end of the year 2013, cities of prefecture level or higher levels should enclose 
migrate workers45 that meet criteria [of local subsidized residence applications {other than 
requirements about hukou registrations presumptively}] into coverage of local subsidized 
residences. (N94) 
 
By the content of the fourth article, it is revealed that supplement of subsidized residences 
was also a task assigned by the national government to local governments. The data also shows 
that the number of suites (tao) and the total area of “land for subsidized residences” (specific 
pieces of land designated for constructions of subsidized residences in city plans of local 
governments) transferred are major indexes used in calculations of subsidized residences’ 
supplements as “governmental assignments”: 
 
…Land supplement in the year 2012 [in Beijing] reflects the principle of “subsidized 
residences first” … According to depiction, supplement of 850 ha of land for affordable housing 
projects [scheduled for] the year 2012 has been fully completed. 166 ha of land has been 
supplied for public rental residences, 104% of the annual plan; 156 ha of land has been 
supplied for economical practical residences, 111% of the annual plan; 78 ha for price limited 
residences, 78% of the annual plan; 450 ha for orientated [to particular customers] settling 
residences, 100% of the annual plan. (N05) 
 
…Wuhan will continue to emphasize and amplify constructions of affordable housing 
projects in order to solve the hard-to-reside problems of middle-low income households and 
newly employed workers. By the end of October, in [Wuhan] municipality, 79 new subsidized 
residence projects begin with constructions, a total of 50.3 thousand tao, completing 92.1% of 
annual target; 52 projects reached completion, a total of 40.5 thousand tao, 99.75% of annual 
plan; 28 projects were allocated for residents, 99.38% of annual plan. In next year [the 
government] plans to begin construct another 80 thousand tao of subsidized residences, 
complete 48 thousand tao, and put 35 thousand tao into use. (N167) 
 
                                                 
following word order: “2 tao apartment suites” (2 tao gongyu), and could be abbreviated as “2 tao”. Therefore, in 
abbreviation the classifier works just like a unit of measurement. In translation, I would keep classifier here and use it in the 
same way a unit of measurement for convenience in expression. 
44 “Zhunru tuichu jizhi” in original report. This system is for regulating selections of low incomers to be provided with 
subsidized residence supplies, and to ensure the occupants of subsidized residences that have their socioeconomic statuses 
improved moving out from subsidized residence (so that the same residence can shelter other “low incomers”). Subsidized 
residences sold with properties usually have only admittance systems; withdrawal systems are more commonly seen for 
subsidized residences of leasing types. 
45 “Wailai wugong renyuan” (“working people who came from elsewhere”) in original article. Refers to workers in a 
Chinese city that have household registered elsewhere. Workers of this type usually migrate from hometown to larger cities 
to earn their lives, hence the title “migrate workers”.  
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The data shows that the city governments of the two sample cities had developed different 
ideas on future plans of subsidized residences in the year 2013. In Beijing, the year 2013 
witnessed the birth a new type of price-delimited residences that can become full properties. 
The new type of price-delimited residence is not officially called as “subsidized residences”, 
but shares some characteristics with subsidized residences (low prices; strict quotas; restricted 
ownership transferring; priority of purchase given to households that are eligible for subsidized 
residence purchasing, etc.). Meanwhile, in Wuhan, the city government officially announced 
the decision of gradually withdrawing supplement of subsidized residences of sold-as-property 
types from the market. In the city government’s expectations, leasing to the public (instead of 
selling) would become the major function of subsidized residences constructed in Wuhan in 
the future.  
In Beijing, the new type of residences was substantially launched at the end of the year, 
yet was harbingered in the end of March: 
 
…On [March] 30th, city government of Beijing issued “Notification of Implementing 
State Council’s Real-estate Market Regulations, Notification of Further Improving Local Real-
estate Market Regulations”. {See footnote 22 on page 36} … Notification intend to combine 
short-term regulations and controls and constructions of long-term mechanisms [in 
governance] by declaring that [the governments] should further reduce prices of self-residing 
type [and] improving type commercial residences, and progressively have [residences of these 
types] added into the series of price-limited residence in management46 … (N11) 
 
In April 2013, a Beijing government official confirmed that research for installing the new 
residence type was in progress: 
 
Yesterday {April 10th, 2013}, Yang Bin, zhuren {director/chairman} of Beijing Municipal 
Commission of Housing and Development attended Beijing Public Service Radio. He noted 
that [city government of] Beijing is researching 47  about policy of adding commercial 
residences of self-residing type and improving type into the series of price-limited residence in 
management; the policy will be disclosed in a short time. (N12) 
 
                                                 
46 Means “treating as the same in term of management, and apply similar managements”. 
47 In Chinese context, “research on policy” can indicate evaluations on feasibility of implementation or execution. 
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A first example of the local government offering lands for the new type of price-delimited 
residences for transfer was seen in July: 
 
The reporter learned from Municipal Bureau of Land48 on 4th [July 2013]: 4 deals were 
reached on Beijing land market49 on [July] 3rd, with a total turnover of 6.69 billion yuan. One 
of the residential pieces of land reached for a deal is the first ever supplement of land for “self-
residing, improving type residence” [development] after implement of Beijing’s detailed plans 
of “national five articles”… (N34) 
 
In the “Jing seven articles” issued at the end of the year, detailed rules for purchasing the 
new type of price-delimited residences, “self-reside commercial residences”, were launched. 
Although called “commercial residences”, prices of this type of residence are compulsively 
lowered in a way not unlike subsidized residences: 
 
…Opinions about Accelerating Constructions of Medium-low Priced, Self-residing, 
Improving Type Residence, jointly issued by Commission of Housing and Development, 
Commission of Development and Reform, Commission of Municipal Planning, Bureau of Land 
and Resources, Bureau of Finance, etc., assured that Beijing will accelerate development of 
self-residing commercial residences 50 … [Developments of self-residing residences] will 
construct residences with most suites’ areas less than 90 square meters; average sale prices in 
principle are set as approximately 30% lower than [prices of] commercial residences of similar 
qualities in similar locations. (N46)  
 
Severity of the rules of purchasing these “self-reside commercial residences” were not 
less than those for purchasing “subsidized residences”: 
 
…According to the [conceived] positions of self-residing commercial residences [in the 
structure of residence supplement], Opinions [about Accelerating Constructions of Medium-
low Priced, Self-residing, Improving Type Residences] prescribes: all households conform to 
[prescriptions of] restriction policies and thus qualified for residence purchases in Beijing are 
eligible to purchase self-residing commercial residences; two types of household among [all 
these households] have priorities in purchase: 1. Households {nuclear families} registered in 
Beijing {in hukou system} that do not own any residences; single citizens that purchases [self-
residing commercial residences] have to be aged 25 or older. 2. Households that have joined 
                                                 
48 Full name is “Beijing Municipal Bureau of Land and Resource” (Beijing shi guotu ziyuan ju). Abbreviation used in 
original report (shi guotu ju). The same abbreviation would be used hereinafter. 
49 “Beijing tudi jiaoyi shichang” (literally “Beijing’s land trading market”) in Chinese. It is hosted by Beijing Municipal 
Bureau of Land and Resource. 
50 Judging from the data as well as some later sources online, this title, “zizhu xing shangpin zhufang” in Chinese (also can 
be “zizhu xing shangpin fang”), is likely to be the official title of the new type of price limited residence in Beijing.  
 46 
 
the lines of waiting for economical practical residences or limit-price residences51. 
Every household can purchase at maximum 1 tao of self-residing commercial residences; 
should the household have that residence sold, [that household] cannot purchase self-residing 
commercial residences in the future. To prevent very few purchasers that profit by transferring 
self-residing commercial residences52 , Opinions prescribe: after purchaser of self-residing 
commercial residences obtain residence ownership certificates, they are, in principle, forbidden 
for transferring [their self-residing commercial residences] for five years; for purchases who 
transfer [their self-residing commercial residences] after 5 years from [the date on which] their  
ownership certificates were issued, if there are appreciation in values [of their residences], 
they should pay 30% of the differences of prices as land revenue.53 (N46) 
 
Judging from these rules of purchase, the new type of residence is more like subsidized 
residence, rather than a type of “commercial residence”, in the customers’ eyes. In fact, some 
reports pointed out this: 
 
…Although still titled as “commercial residence {shangpin fang}”, they are managed in 
some manners resembling subsidized residences. From views of [people in real-estate] industry, 
“self-residing commercial residences” are not that different from previously implemented types 
“economical practical residences” and “limit-price residences”, as it is also a type of 
commercial residence with political subsidy attributes and orientated to [sold for] particular 
social groups. In terms of price determinations and quitting mechanics, “self-residing 
commercial residences” is even like a duplication of “limit-price residences”54… (N55) 
 
City government of Beijing and its subordinates seemed to be quite enthusiastic about this 
newly introduced type of residence, as it made a public guarantee about amount of supply just 
at the scene of the new residence type’s launching. Forced reductions on prices of residences 
of this type was also revealed: 
 
…Yesterday {October 23rd, 2013} afternoon, Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing 
and Urban-Rural Development (known as Commission of Housing and Development 
hereinafter)55 posted on its website Opinions about Accelerating Constructions of Medium-
                                                 
51 “Xianjia fang” in original content. This is an alternative name of “double-limited residences”, not referring to all 
residences with prices limited. 
52 This is a literal translation. Actual meaning of this sentence is more close to “to suppress those individuals that purchase 
self-residing residences primarily for transferring them and gain profits later”. 
53 This fee is paid to financial offices of governments. The original sentence has three characters after “land revenue” (tudi 
shouyi): “deng jia kuan”. Due to words are not separated by spaces in Chinese, the seven characters may have two possible 
interpretations when put together: “tudi shouyi dengjia kuan”, means “a fee equivalent to land revenue”; or “tudi shouyi deng 
jiakuan”, means “fees such as land revenue”. By the content of original report I cannot tell which interpretation is correct. 
Since both interpretation implies “should pay land revenue”, I decide to translate just as that. 
54 “Limit-price residences” or “double-limited residences” cannot be transferred within 5 years; when transferred, 35% of 
the differences of prices should be paid as land revenue. 
55 Abbreviation is used in original report. 
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low Priced, Self-residing, Improving Type Residences (Jing Jian Fa [2013] No. 510, known as 
Opinions hereinafter)56 [, which] claims that Beijing will accelerate self-residing commercial 
residence constructions, [and will] supply lands for [construction of] no less than 20 thousand 
tao self-residing commercial residences before end of the year 2013… (N50) 
 
Pieces of land for the new type of residence swarmed into the land market soon after: 
 
…Yesterday {November 4th, 2013}, Municipal Bureau of Land transferred 8 residential 
purpose pieces of land altogether, 6 of them were pieces of land for self-residing commercial 
residence constructions. This is the first time “self-residing residence lands” transferred in a 
“batch” after “Jing seven articles”; amount of self-residing commercial residences planned to 
be developed [on these pieces of land] was approximately 510 thousand square meter. (N56) 
 
Furthermore, as the end of the year 2013 was pending by that time, the city government 
of Beijing began to make plans covering the upcoming years: 
 
…Beijing’s “Jing seven article” even put forward that accelerating developments of self-
residing commercial residences, [for that the city government] will complete supplement of 
lands for 70 thousand tao self-residing commercial residences during this year {2013} and next 
year {2014}. (N111) 
 
Such enthusiasm seems to come from anxiety of the city government of Beijing that the 
prices of residences on the housing market may lose control, which would instantly declare the 
city government’s “dereliction of duties”. Facing such risks, the choice of city government is 
to suppress prices with blatant governmental power. In the case of introducing “self-residing 
commercial residences”, the city government forcing the developers on the one hand to ensure 
lower prices and enough supplies, while placing restrictions of purchases on the customers on 
the other hand to prevent excessive demands.  
While Beijing’s government tried to blur the boundary between “commercial residences” 
and “(property-type) subsidized residences” sold on the housing market, city government of 
Wuhan was attempting to segregate the two types thoroughly. The city government’s first 
                                                 
56 “Jing Jian Fa [2013] No.510” is the official number of this paper (Opinions) used within the Chinese administration 
system. Abbreviation is used in original report. 
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expression of this intention in 2013 was seen in late May: 
 
Message came from residence management of Wuhan yesterday {May 23rd, 2013}: Wuhan 
will launch applications for public rental residence qualifications as early as beginning of June. 
Public rental residence will officially debut on the stage of Wuhan’s subsidized residence series, 
and become the crucial solution for the middle and low income social groups’ residence 
deficiencies. Meanwhile, economical practical residences, the more renowned type of 
subsidized residence, will gradually exit [the series of subsidized residence]. Applications of 
eco-practical residence57 qualification certificates will be terminated soon… (N150) 
 
The new system began to operate only days later: 
 
On June 3rd {2013}, Wuhan will officially launch applications for public rental residence 
qualifications and suspend applications for economical practical residences qualifications. 
Subsidized residence system of the city of Yangtze58 transform officially from “property type” 
to “renting type”… (N151) 
 
Agent of the city government’s housing management department expressed in the reports 
about reasons for such decisions: 
 
An agent of house management system explained: “property ownership of an eco-
practical residence belongs to its residents; even though household income of its owner may 
increase in the future, this set of residence is hard to vacate and allocated to other middle or 
low income households. One residence may only accommodate one household. That is 
inefficient.” But rental residences like public rental residences is different: the tenants do not 
obtain property ownerships; when a tenant moves in, he leases the residence with market prices; 
[in the future,] the government could adjust his subsidy flexibly in accordance with changes in 
his income.59 With this method, limited funds and residence could be used to offer residences 
for more middle and low income households. “Inefficiency is the most fundamental reason of 
eco-practical residences’ withdrawal from city of Yangtze.” (N150) 
 
With sold-as-property type of subsidized residences withdrawn from the market, Wuhan’s 
reformation secluded some customers from the delimited transaction space defined as the scope 
of this research. It is a change on the boundary of the space. In this sense, it is hard to discuss 
                                                 
57 “Jing shi fang” in Chinese. An abbreviation of “jingji shiyong fang” (economical practical residence). Abbreviation is 
used in original report here. The same abbreviation will be used hereinafter. 
58 “City of Yangtze”, or “city of jiang” (jiangcheng) is a commonly known nickname of Wuhan within China. 
59 A tenant of rental type subsidized residences in China will have part of his rent covered by the government; the amount 
covered is determined by his personal/household income. That is how they are “subsidized”. 
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“the meanings of this revision of policy” within the delimited transaction space. Yet the exercise 
of governmental power is still notable here: the old system was abolished and the new system 
was launched in merely two weeks. The customers have no other choices but to adapt to the 
new policies. This manifested that the state has few rivals in transactional spaces, and it can 
carry out its will with little resistance from the other actors in transactional systems, providing 
a perfect example for Weber’s theories.  
 
In conclusion of all discussions in part 5.1, the strategy of the state dealing with the 
customers on the housing market in the two sample cities is like a “carrot and stick” approach. 
On the one hand, the state shows the customers promises of benefit; on the other, it exercises 
its power to put restraints on actions and strategies of the customers. On its benign side, the 
state is a dedicated enforcer of residence prices controls and philanthropic provider of low price 
residences for customers with low socioeconomic status. On the severe side, the state puts strict 
limitations, most notably quota policies, on customers purchasing commercial residences, and 
even stricter limitations on customers purchasing price-delimited residences. The customers on 
the housing market can always get hope from the voices and the actions of the state, but they 
must sacrifice some of their freedom of choice in exchange. 
Nonetheless, a general strategy of the state’s governance cannot fully compose a “carrot 
and stick” approach, as this idiom refers to a tactic of sanctions. The Chinese state also has 
strategy of sanctions aside from the general strategy of governance, but to discuss this, I have 
to go through the strategy of the customers in the relationship with the state first. 
 
5.2. Strategy of the customers: maneuver, or withdraw the authority 
 
The state’s strategy of regulating the housing market has a mixed result. Albeit restrictions 
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may prevent situations on the market from developing worse, aforementioned policies cannot 
mitigate a fundamental contradiction in the housing market: a tension between demand and 
supply on the market. After all, the Chinese housing market is widely believed to be a “seller’s 
market”, since the country has a large population and is on a path of rapid urbanization. This 
may explain why the state cannot stop the rise of the prices even though enforcing controls on 
prices all the time. The “futility” of price control measures frequently appear in the reports: 
 
…Today {May 20th, 2013}, National Bureau of Statistics published statistical results of 
changes in residence sale prices in 70 large and middle sized cities in April 2013. For prices 
of newly constructed commercial residences, compared with the same month last year, only 2 
cities observed declines; a grand total of 68 cities are reported with price raise … This is the 
second consecutive month of constant rise in residence prices after State Council’s introduction 
of national five articles in February 2013… (N26) 
 
…China Index Academy published a report that showed: in October, in 100 cities 
nationwide, average price of (newly constructed) residences was 10,865 yuan per square meter, 
increased 1.24% (vs. SPLM) 60, marking a 17th month of vs. SPLM increase since June 2012. 
Examining by vs. SPLY, average price of residences in 100 cities nationwide increased by 10.69% 
{compared with October 2012}. Average price of residences in 10 large cities61 led by Beijing 
and Shanghai is 18,533 yuan per square meter, increased by 1.95% vs. SPLM and 15.69% vs. 
SPLY. (N111) 
 
In terms of subsidized residences, apart from issues of stricter requirements for purchase 
eligibilities (usually no less than requirements for commercial residence purchase eligibilities 
plus proofs of lower-than-prescribed household assets and household incomes), there was also 
a reported deficiency of supply. According to the data, many customers have to wait for a long 
time for their purchases because there were too many applications. Beijing’s situation in 2013 
was particularly terrible: 
 
…Up to the end of the last year {2012}, there were 132 thousand households in Beijing 
waiting [for subsidized residences]. City government of Beijing had promised to solve the 
waiting households’ difficulties of residing during the 12th five-year plan period62. (N15) 
                                                 
60 Abbreviation of “same period last month”, just like “vs SPLY”. In original contents, another statistical method frequently 
used in China, “huanbi”, is used here. This method is to compare statistics at one time point to statistics of one month or one 
season (three months) ago.  
61 Original news report does not identify which 10 large cities. 
62 PRC’s 12th five year plan last for a duration from the year 2011 to the year 2015. 
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Compared to a-Yong, xiao Yu63 was not that fortunate. Since his entry into the waiting list 
[of double-limited residences that was] published by Housing Security Office64 in April 2010, 
he has been waiting for 42 months… (N44) 
 
Wuhan’s situation in 2013, in comparison to Beijing, seems to be better. Nonetheless, 
there were still a considerable number of customers waiting in the line.  
 
…Inquiry of reporters shows that there are 5176 households holding certificates of eco-
practical residence purchase qualifications at present. Compared with the number of nearly 
7000 in middle of last year {2012}, number of household holding eco-practical residence 
purchase certificates has decreased evidently. (N150) 
 
Please notice that the number of waiting households in the quotation above is only the 
number of households waiting for one type of subsidized residences (eco-practical residences 
in this case) in Wuhan. Taking that into account, the total number of customers waiting for 
subsidized residences in Wuhan should still be considerable.  
Spending years waiting for a subsidized residence has a significant downside: changes in 
market conditions during the years may lead to unexpected results, sometimes results the 
customers found unaffordable: 
 
…Ms. Liu and many others got quotas from the lottery in 2008 and chose their residences 
in 2012; but the average price of 7351.41 yuan per square meter announced in the end of the 
year 2013, which was 70% higher than average prices of the first batch of residence allocated 
for quotas of the same lottery, was so much higher than expected, many were no longer able to 
afford those units. Changes in policies and market during the five years offer them little leeway. 
The options in front of them are: get into heavy debt for purchase, or abandon their quotas and 
turn to [going after] public rental residences or low rent residences. (N77) 
 
From these quotations, it could be seen that the “carrots” the state gave to the customers 
taste not as good as the customers expected. Yet as the customers cannot rival the state in most 
                                                 
63 “A” in “a-Yong” is a common prefix for nicknames of young people. “Xiao” in “xiao Yu” is of the same. “aYong” and 
“xiao Yu” are pseudonyms used in reports. 
64 Not an official translation. Name of the office in Chinese is “beijing shi zhufang baozhang bangongshi”, abbreviated as 
“beijing shi zhu bao ban”. It is a subordinate of Commission of Housing and Development. 
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occasions, they regularly do not conflict with the state or its agents. Instead, they find their own 
paths to satisfy their own needs. No cases in my data show direct conflicts between the 
customers and the state; yet multiple cases show that some customers deploy their own method 
to satisfy their own desires. I classify these methods into two types: “maneuver” and “revoking 
authority”. “Maneuver” refers to customer’s tactics to access legal products on the legal market, 
while “revoking authority”, as the name implies, means tactics that deny the legal market 
created by the state as an authority and turn to the informal market. 
“Maneuvers” shown in my data also have multiple approaches. A common approach is to 
use the loopholes, flaws, or weaknesses in the policies or in the executions of the policies. A 
popular tactic that utilizes the loopholes in the rules and policies, as seen in the data, refers to 
“fake divorce”. “Fake divorces” are real divorces in term of legality concerns; describing this 
kind of divorce with “fake” is because couples using this tactic do not really want to split up. 
The divorces are solely for beneficial purposes – for purchasing new residences. This method 
takes advantage of a particularity of the policies: calculations of residences under customers’ 
ownerships use “households” as subjects of ownership rather than individuals.  
 
…When he thinks he cannot come up with any feasible tactics, one of his friend’s words 
reminded him: “if there are no better ways, just do a fake divorce hey.” His friend told him that 
when purchases begin to be restricted in housing market last year, two couples he was familiar 
with were persuaded and faked their divorce, and bought residences successfully in the end.  
Xia Fei discussed with his wife. Seemingly the worst tactic, fake divorce turned out to be 
the best solution for them. By faking divorce, he could put the residence they want to sell under 
his wife’s name {making his wife the sole owner of that residence}, leaving only the residence 
they want to be kept for self-residing under his name. After the fake divorce, his wife sells the 
small residence first, which can evade the 20% personal income tax; then she purchases a large 
residence. Because his wife does not have any residence finance record, her purchase can be 
recognized as a first time. When financing, she can pay only 30% as down payment, which can 
be covered solely with income of selling the small residence.  
“Who will divorce for a residence, my son?” In the beginning, Xia Fei’s parents strongly 
opposed his plan. Divorce, disbanding a family – all these are not dignified things in the 
opinions of the older generation. After several rounds of “mental works {persuasions}”, the 
elders consented reluctantly. “With more honorable ways, it is indeed impossible to change to 
a larger residence with our family’s economic conditions.” (N39) 
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Fake divorce is shown to be popular in large cities nationwide: 
 
On February 20th, 2013, the executive meeting of the State Council launched real-estate 
market regulation and control policies “nation five articles”. Like a stone thrown into a pond 
of water, the new policies immediately set off thousands of layers of waves. Cities including 
Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xiamen witnessed a dramatic rise in divorce ratios in March. 
Recently, our reporters learned from Wuhan Civil Affairs Bureau: divorce ratio of Wuhan 
suddenly increased by approximately 30% in this March. “‘Divorce in mirth’, ‘coming for 
divorce while holding each other’s hand’ are very commonly seen.” (N145) 
 
Now that there are fake divorces, one may be curious about existence of fake marriages. 
In fact, fake marriages do appear in the data as a method of evading the restraints on hukou 
statuses. This case is seen in Beijing, which shows that the possibility of utilizing fake 
marriages even brings about informal intermediary industries: 
 
So-called “marriage tuo”, refers to the following action: a real-estate intermediary 
institution introduce and assist someone from somewhere out of Beijing that is not eligible to 
purchase residences [in Beijing] to get married with someone who has hukou registered in 
Beijing {which offers that people from elsewhere Beijing’s residence purchase quota}; then 
help them to buy residence; and then divorce. The “Beijing hokouer” who successfully assists 
the “non-Beijing hukouer” to obtain Beijing’s residence purchase quota and buy residence will 
receive a considerable “reward” afterward.  
Previously, there were [reporters of] media who tracked the whole process of {tracked 
from the beginning to the end of the following events}: a “non-Beijing hukouer”, who do not 
have eligibility to purchase residence in Beijing, introduced by clerks of an intermediary 
company to a “Beijing hukouer”. The two people met, signed a contract, went to civil affair 
bureau to get marriage certificates in one hour, and then purchased a residence. (N37) 
 
The logics of fake divorces and fake marriages seen here are apparent: to deliberately 
create marginal events that meet the requirements of the policies. Traditionally, the Chinese 
people treats marriage as “a big issue in one’s life”. This idea could be seen in the way Xia 
Fei’s parents reacted in the case N39 quoted above. But Xia Fei was actually quite lucky as he 
persuaded his parents successfully in the end. In another case, the protagonist’s parents fall into 
illness because of the protagonist’s fake divorce decision: 
 
… After knowing their son was about to divorce, Cheng Qing’s parent fell ill due to worry. 
Cheng Qing explained for several times, but his parents still cannot understand, “you were 
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living together happily, why divorce for a residence?”(N145).  
 
The reason for such a great cross-generational difference in ideas and actions is evident: 
interests. For some customers of the younger generation, the restrictions on the market impede 
their pursuits of properties that they can afford and force them to choose between downgrading 
living qualities and abolishing the morality of their parents temporarily. Evidently, some of 
them may choose the latter. Xia Fei’s words serves a best explanation for this: 
 
“…Some experts say that our society steps into confusion now, with economic interests 
overwhelming kinship affinities blatantly and moral integrity broken and scattered all over the 
ground. But, if prices of residences were not this high and everyone could afford residences 
with their own strengths and efforts, who would like to take detours? Integrity and living, well, 
we have to live in the first place and above all.” (N39) 
 
Using loopholes in policies employs tricks, yet this type of strategy stays legal as long as 
the loopholes are not amended by new policies or rules. There are also illegal types of 
“maneuver” strategies, most notably bribes. One may expect the occurrence of bribes on 
Chinese housing market, as extremely high marginal costs for customers to buy new residences 
provide perfect space for the power holders to seek for rents. 
 
…Prosecutor accused that: during Wang mou65 serve as clerk of Residence Property 
Registration Office under Chaoyang District Residence Management Bureau, Beijing, in the 
years 2011 and 2012, he utilized conveniences [brought about by] his position – in charge of 
registration, certificate making, and certificate issuance for residence property ownership – and 
colluded with two real-estate intermediary agents including Zhao {pseudonym} in illegally 
accepting and finishing dozens of residence ownership registrations for purchasers not eligible 
to purchase residences in Beijing, which offended Beijing’s residence purchase restriction 
policies, in the process of residence ownership transfer registrations; and accepted illegal 
rewards of 600 thousand yuan in total from the two intermediary agents. (N01) 
 
But the civil servants are not the only targets of the customer’s bribes on the housing 
market. Agents of developers, as the actors who are actually in charge of the finished products, 
                                                 
65 In Chinese news reporting lawsuits, for criminals, suspects, accomplices, or other individuals related with crimes that are 
not suitable to be fully named, their full names are substituted with their family names plus “mou” (“someone”). In each 
quotation of this research, I would only translate the first “mou” and omit the rest. 
 55 
 
can also become targets of the bribes: 
 
…In August 2012, customer Zhang Yong (pseudonym) found Yu mou, asked Yu whether or 
not there are still economical practical residences [in the project Yu worked for] left unsold, 
and implied that he {Zhang} can offer some “reward money” [if Yu can assist him to purchase 
an eco-practical residence successfully]. At that moment, Yu happened to be fretting about 
lacking money to buy and decorate a residence for his own marriage, so he replied instantly: 
“I can make a transfer sheet and get the keys [of residence for you], but for the [ownership] 
certifications [of the residence] you have to wait for some time.” Zhang Yong, anxious to buy 
a residence, expressed no opposition, and [later] transferred 270 thousand yuan to a bank 
account under Yu’s name according to Yu’s requests.  
Soon afterward, Yu covertly took out some residence purchase receipts from finance office 
of his company, forged a residence transfer sheet, and imitated a signature of clerks of finance 
office on the sheet. Then, Yu led Zhang Yong to the microdistrict’s property management 
company and finished with residence transfer procedure. Zhang Yong successfully obtained 
keys of a residence. (N149) 
 
Some customers would try to find access to residences by seeking help from anyone who 
appears to be substantially in charge of residences. By doing so, those customers may become 
victims of fraud eventually: 
 
…In May last year {2012}, Wang mou {an acquaintance of criminal Hu mou} told Cheng 
Jun that Hu had unsold double-limited residences on his hands … Cheng Jun was tempted. 
“My hukou is registered in Macheng City, and I have never paid pension funds in Wuhan, I am 
even not eligible to buy an ordinary commercial residence [in Wuhan]. Can I really buy a 
double-limited residence?” He asked. Hu patted his chest and guaranteed that he obtained 
those unsold residences with “inner guanxi66”, and hence there would be no difficulties [for 
Cheng] to get “two certificates”. 
… 
In the second half of last year, message came from Wang again: Hu still had unsold 
[double-limited] residences on his hands…  
… 
Wang led Cheng Jun and his wife to take a look at the residences. “So-called taking a look 
at residences was actually looking at layouts of other people’s home.” [Cheng Jun recalled.] 
… 
Back from visiting the residence, Cheng Jun began to raise money. 370 thousand yuan 
was not a small amount for him, not to mention he had to pay the full amount at once. Tried 
his best to persuade himself that he needed to “be cruel to himself”, he sold his residence in 
his hometown for 100 thousand yuan. Added to this amount the funds he borrowed from his 
relatives and his own deposits saved for years, Cheng finally succeed in raising the money. 
                                                 
66 Literally “relationship”. In Chinese context, this word usually represents social relationships involving interest exchanges. 
When someone claims he have “guanxi”, he means that he can get some profits from some social relationships. “Guanxi” is 
typically used for someone out of the state’s hierarchy forming alliance of interest with an agent of the state in order to 
obtain convenience with aids from his ally’s political power. In this sense, I consider guanxi to be both a product and a 
technique of bribe (informal transactions of interests), and therefore I would not distinguish them in this part of analysis.  
 56 
 
On March 28th this year (2013), Cheng Jun invited Hu to his own store and paid off the 
price of residence face to face there…  
… 
Until late May, Cheng called Hu multiple times, intending to ask about progress of the 
purchase, but Hu’s phone was always turned off. This time, the couple panicked. 
After rounds of inquiries, Cheng Jun discovered more than a dozen of other victims of 
[Hu’s] cheating… (N165) 
 
By definition of revoking authorities, bribing is in fact an action of authority revoking, as 
the actor does not trust the rules set up by the state. Yet the most authentic authority revoking 
strategy of the customers shown in the data is to turn to the illegal Chinese housing market, 
namely “small property residences” 67  (xiao chanquan fang). Residences of this type are 
developed on collectively-owned lands; according to the laws, it is illegal to sell residences of 
this type to urban residents, nor is it legal for urban residents to purchase them. Hernando de 
Soto introduced a concept in his work on Peruvian illegal (or in his own word, “extralegal”) 
economies that seems help here: “cost of formality”, which can be further divided into “cost of 
access” and “cost of remaining” (De Soto, 2002: 132). In discussions about how people 
determine their purchases, the concept of “cost of access” is more relevant. According to de 
Soto’s idea, the “cost of access” of an economy refers to all requirements that have to be met 
before that action can be legally conducted (ibid: 132-133). In the case of the Chinese housing 
market, all requirements for legal purchases compose the “cost of access”. Evidently, if a 
customer finds “cost of access” unaffordable, he may choose to abandon entering the legal 
market and to seek for options in illegal market. A typical, detailed story in data collected from 
Beijing explains how a customer decided to revoke authority of the state because he is 
unwilling to pay high “cost of access”: 
 
…After his graduation from university 4 years ago, Zhou Peng was unwilling to be stuck 
together with his parents in a cold, small, less than 20 square meter pingfang, so he rented in 
                                                 
67 “Small” here is in contrast with “large properties”, which is the legal ownership of residences. Owners of residences of 
this type sometimes have property ownership certificates issued by county governments, township governments, or village 
committees. These certificates are not recognized by the national government or the laws (which is another proof of the 
internal power struggle within the Chinese state), and thus are called “small properties”. 
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a peasant’s residence in far suburbs. One room, 500 yuan per month. When his girlfriend 
proposed marriage, Zhou Peng found himself stumped. He discovered that his family cannot 
meet Beijing’s requirements for subsidized residence application. 
The situation was: according to stipulations of Beijing’s policy, if residents in central city68 
want to apply for subsidized residences, they need to vacate their original residence. However, 
in perspective of many residents of central city, such stipulations precluded them from 
subsidized residences. “In the era of welfare housing69, if the danwei have available residences, 
we can vacate our pingfang for a residence in [apartment] building. Even after welfare housing, 
we can still obtain settling residences or monetary compensations calculated by areas [of our 
present residence].” Zhou Peng’s father explained.  
In contrast, compensations of vacating original residence, allocated by governments of 
districts, would be calculated into total assets of the household. That is to say, however large 
their original residences are, the compensation that Zhou’s household can get [from vacating 
their pingfang] cannot exceed the 570 thousand yuan asset maximum prescribed by double-
limited residence application requirements.70  But on the illegal market of rights of using 
residence, right of renting a collective residence71 in central city can be sold for 1.2 million 
yuan; as for two bedroom relocating residences allocated for households that had their 
pingfang demolished in reforms72, these residences usually have estimated values around 6 
million yuan.  
Zhou Peng also cannot apply for subsidized residence on behalf of himself, sine Beijing 
stipulate that single citizen must be aged 30 or older for applying subsidized residence. “Who 
can wait until 30 years old to get married? [If] get married first and then apply, who knows how 
many years we have to wait?” 
[They] waited for easing relocation73 every year, but relocation never came. [Due to] 
rigid stipulations, subsidized residences were impossible to reach just like palaces in the sky. 
Commercial residences were out of their affordability.  
Zhou Peng began to prepare purchasing small property. “I’m forced on this way. All other 
doors are shut for me now.” (N80)  
 
5.3. Sanctions of the state on the customer’s strategy 
 
In response to the customers’ strategies, the state doubtlessly tried to punish customers 
                                                 
68 Central city (zhongxin chengqu) of Beijing refer to the two administrative districts of Dongcheng and Xicheng, 
approximately a small area inside or close to 2nd Ring Road. This area is roughly the old city fortification of Beijing.  
69 Welfare housing (fuli fenfang) was the residence allocation system used by PRC in the era of planned economy. 
Allocations was practiced by state-organized productive institutions or bodies, known as “work-units” (danwei). The welfare 
housing system, or housing allocation system, was abolished by PRC in 1998 and replaced by housing market. 
70 To make it clearer: if Zhou’s household vacate their single floor bungalow (pingfang) for double-limited residence 
application, compensation they receive for vacating will be calculated as assets of the household. Beijing prescribe a 570 
thousand maximum household asset amount for each 3 member household (like Zhou’s) applying for double-limited 
residences. Therefore, to keep Zhou’s household’s total asset within this prescribed range of double-limited residence 
eligibility, the compensation they can receive must be equal to or less than 570 thousand yuan. 
71 “Gongfang” in original report, an abbreviation of “gongyou zhufang” (collectively-owned residences), are residences 
owned by governments or former danwei and renting to individuals. This is the major type of residence existed in PRC’s 
welfare housing era.  
72 “Bungalow area reforms” (penghu qu gaizao) is a type of governmental practice in China, usually involves demolishing 
initial bungalows (pingfang) in an area and then carry out new constructions on the land vacated by demolition. 
73 Easing relocation (waiqian shujie) is a type of policy in Beijing, refers to relocating residents of central city to suburbs in 
order to ease off the population pressure in central metropolitan. Households being “easing relocated” usually obtain settling 
residences much better than their original bungalows, and that is the reason why Zhou Peng’s family “wait for it every year”. 
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who violated the rules set up by the state. City government of Beijing wrote anti-deceitful-
customer measures into the first article of “Jing seven articles”, which is against not only the 
customers, but also developers that cooperate with the customers’ sham strategies: 
 
…Residence purchasers found to purchase illegally by fraudulence are added to black 
lists and prohibited to purchase residence in Beijing within 5 years; enterprises that assist 
[purchasers] in fraudulence have all procedures frozen in Beijing; those who allegedly 
committed crimes are transferred to public security institutions for investigations. (N46) 
 
Wuhan also have regulations in the first article of “Han seven articles”: 
 
…Strengthen cooperation between offices; reinforce mechanism of joint investigations on 
residence purchase qualifications; seriously investigate and dispose real-estate developing 
enterprises, intermediary institutions, and individuals that are suspected to defraud residence 
purchase eligibilities. (N166) 
 
And also reiterated sanction policies against developers that helps the customers with their 
strategies in the sixth article, which has been quoted once above: 
 
…Severely investigate and sanction illegal actions such as hiding new plots for sales, 
hoarding residences as stocks, artificially forcing up residence prices, abetting and assisting 
residence purchasers to forge certificate materials {files required for obtaining certifications} 
and to attain eligibilities of residence purchases fraudulently, etc. (N166) 
 
The judiciary branches of the state also expressed its firm support to the state on punishing 
customers and developers who violated the rules: 
 
…In response to a series of disputes and lawsuit cases, people’s court have established 
precedents: clearly knowing that [the purchaser] was ineligible to purchase but still made 
down payment, both [buying and selling] parties have liability. (N139) 
 
For specific affairs, all strategies discussed in section 5.2 are shown to be noticed by the 
state. Loopholes are seen mended by the state, and punishments on some actors that uses those 
strategies are reported. Runners of intermediary businesses for fake marriages were ordered to 
rectify: 
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…In investigations on yesterday {July 16th, 2013}, two intermediary institutions that were 
often subjected to exposures [of improper activities] and complains in Shunyi District, 
Jinseshiguang and Jinziyan, was issued notifications of rectification; [officials] instructed 
intermediary institutions to correct their activities immediately and to submit written reports 
of correction [afterwards]… (N37) 
 
In cases of bribes, the sides that accepted the bribes were punished by the law: 
 
…Prosecutor consider: Wang mou, being an agent of the state, carried out registrations 
of residence ownerships in violation of stipulations of residence purchase restrictions, which 
seriously impeded implementation of the state’s real-estate regulations and controls; illegally 
accepting others’ properties and profit others. [He] shall be prosecuted for his criminal 
liabilities with the crime of abuse of authority and the bribery crime. (N01)  
 
The reporters learned from Procuratorate of Jianghan District that Yu mou’s arrest has 
been approved due to suspicion of cheating on Yu. (N149) 
 
Fake divorces, nevertheless, are not seen to be substantially confined by the state during 
the year 2013. But in Beijing, people who fake divorce are somehow restricted by the new, 
stricter quota for single customers mentioned on page 36. In Wuhan, restrictions on fake 
divorces that do not directly come from the state and its agents is recorded:  
 
…However, Ms. Liu, a personal loan manager of a large state owned bank’s Jianghan 
branch, told reporters that there was unified stipulation on residence purchases after divorce 
[in their bank]: financing for residence purchases requires half year from obtain of a divorce 
certificate. She explained that due to expansion of the size of “divorce to evade restriction” 
social group, this stipulation was executed in all branches of the same bank in Wuhan.  
… 
A personal loan clerk of a bank’s Jiangan branch noted: if a former household that owned 
multiple residences in the past is found to have all residences under either husband’s or wife’s 
name, leaving the other side without any residence under his/her name, then this former couple 
are unlikely to pass investigations of credit applications. (N161) 
 
There are no evidences in the data that the state or its agents issued orders to financial 
institutions that generate these restricting measure, but I consider these measures as possible 
results of the political atmosphere created by the state. After all, as seen in the quotation from 
case N46, Beijing’s government had begun to punish those institutions that help customers in 
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fraudulent behaviors. Although not directly revealed in the data, it is possible that the local 
governments of Wuhan had already launched similar policies, or the financial institutions 
anticipated that the local governments in Wuhan would follow in launching those policies. 
As for the customers using “revoking authority” strategies, the state’s response is to 
exclude them from the legal domain of Chinese housing market by not recognizing residences 
they bought from illegal markets as properties. In the data, customers who revoke the authority 
and choose products on the illegal market never got acceptance from the state: 
 
… On November 22nd, Ministry of Land and Resource and Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development jointly issued Urgent Notification of Firmly Containing Illegal 
Constructions and Sales of “Small Property Residences” (known as Notification hereinafter) 
to request local governments to steadily oppose the issue of illegal constructions and sales of 
“small properties” that appears recently in some places.  
… 
Notification emphasizes: constructions and sales of “small property residences” seriously 
violate laws and regulations against land usages and urban and rural constructions … 
Constructions, sales, and purchases of “small property residences” are not protected by the 
laws … (N114)  
 
Hence, according to the data, at least until the year 2013, the Chinese state reinforces the 
legal boundary of the housing market constantly to maintain the “purity” of the legal market. 
If a customer choose to withdraw the authority from the state, the state would expel him from 
the system of governance in return.  
 
To summarize all discussions above in part 6, the power relationship between the state 
and the customers as shown in my data is truly highly dominated by the state’s will, which is 
supported by the state’s governmental power. The state can carry out its will with the power it 
has and, as a result, the customers have their freedoms of choices greatly restricted. Although 
the state attempts to offer benefits to the customers who follow the rules it sets, the effect of 
these rules cannot satisfy all customers. Therefore, some customers that do not trust the rules 
of the state would withdraw the authority of the state by disobedience. The state in return 
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amends the regulation system, punishes those partly revoke the authority, and expels those 
completely revoke the authority of the state. 
 
  
 62 
 
6. Developers over customers: intimates in advertisements 
 
The power relationship between the developers and the customers on the Chinese housing 
market is significantly different from the one between the state and the customers: compared 
to those of the state, the developer’s exercises of power are latent. Advertisement is a type of 
data that cannot present direct interactions between the developers and the customers. To deal 
with data of this type, I have to adopt a different perspective of analysis and construct a 
framework of explanation first.  
 
6.1 Framework of explanation on developer-customer power relationship 
 
Pierre Bourdieu’s the Social Structures of the Economy is an important source of theories 
for this part of analysis. This monograph focuses on the French housing market, but many of 
its contents fit into the Chinese situations, especially the developer-customer relationship 
where the state is mostly absent. In this book, Bourdieu reckons that developers of residences 
have intrinsic advantages over customers due to the mechanisms of the market: the developers 
normally can gather abundant experience from thousands of customers it had dealt with; but 
for most of the customers their investments are just unique, singular experiences. (Bourdieu, 
2005: 165) A notable effect of this asymmetry in experiences is the developers’ monopoly of 
information, which is an advantage of the developers that may be harnessed in real-estate 
advertising. Douglas North believes that the party with more information in a transaction may 
try to gain by concealing the information they monopolize (North, 1990: 30). That is to say, the 
developers may manipulate the information conveyed by their advertisements in order to 
maximize their interests. 
As aforementioned, Bourdieu considers housing advertisements as weapons of symbolic 
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campaigns used by real-estate companies. In advertising campaigns, real-estate firms as sellers 
want to “make good the potential gap between the products as actually supplied and perceived 
and the expectation of that product.”(Bourdieu, 2005: 54) Bourdieu considers advertisement to 
be most successful when they play up, stimulate, or arouse pre-existing dispositions (ibid: 55). 
By advertising, the developers try to let the customers believe that the residences advertised 
meet the customers’ demands, and may even exceed the customers’ expectations. I use this 
proposition as a basic premise in analyses of this part. 
Bourdieu also presents other inspiring ideas in his book. One of these ideas refers to the 
“production of the product”: the developers offer to the customers not only residences, but also 
whole sets of discourse around those residences (ibid: 169). This notion applies well to the 
Chinese situations: Chinese housing advertisements tend to cover a lot of topics of the 
microdistricts, most notably the topics I identified in the codebook. Many of them are not about 
the residences themselves or even not about microdistricts themselves, but about their 
surroundings. In such cases, the advertisements’ narrations are far beyond “introductions of the 
products”; rather, they are better described as “fabrications of discourses”. A possible reason 
for this fashion of the production of product is the high opportunity costs of investments for 
customers on Chinese housing market. As illustrated in chapter 5, most Chinese customers 
have few opportunities to select residences to buy, yet after making choices they may have to 
be bound with that choice for years. The Chinese culture also encourage investment strategies 
with long-term orientations; that is to say, strategies that are more likely to foster future rewards. 
In fact, the work of Hofstede and Hofstede (2005: 210-211) suggests that the culture of 
mainland China is by far the most long-term oriented culture in the world. Consequently, what 
Chinese customers tend to make are choices “for a life time”. In order to ingratiate this 
prevalent disposition held by the customers, developers try to illustrate their products as 
“perfect” in their promotional discourses. After all, the developers have to produce products 
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that fulfill expectations of the customers to maintain their positions on the market. This is 
actually demonstrated by the data:  
 
…Zhongliang Wanke Changyangbandao want to forge such a city; see constructing most 
reside-suitable ideal residences as duty; adopt advanced green low-carbon technologies; one 
million square meters of fully decorated ecological residences announce commencement of 
livable era. Change urban people’s live patterns, construct new healthy fashionable lives in 
national capital … Truly achieve perfect living, forge a beloved “city of a life time”. (B93) 
 
Coleman’s interpretation of trust mentioned in Chapter 2 is also an inspiring approach to 
explain the Chinese customers’ pickiness in offering their trust. Coleman (1990: 99) uses a 
formula to explain the mechanism that people decide to offer trust to a potential trustee 
(receiver of trust) or not. There are three factors in the formula: P, for the chance of receiving 
gain (or the estimated probability that the trustee is trustworthy); L, for the potential loss if the 
potential trustee is untrustworthy; and G, for the potential gain if the potential trustee is 
trustworthy. Coleman’s formula points out that: if relationships of a potential trustor’s P, L, and 
G fit in the pattern that the estimated gain (product of P and G) is greater than estimated loss 
(product of 1-P and L), then that individual would choose to offer the trust to the potential 
trustee. In the case of customers on the Chinese housing market, as potential trustors, they have 
little idea about G due to their inexperience, but they can see an extremely high L (waste of a 
quota on both purchase and financing; years stuck in an unsatisfactory residences and paying 
its loans; etc.). Therefore, if a developer (a company) as a potential trustee wants to receive 
trust from the potential trustor, it should try to improve the estimated P and G in the formula. 
In the context of promotional discourses, showing expertise is a method of increasing P, and 
giving tempting information is a method of improving G. Admittedly, in the process of reaching 
a deal, promotional discourse is just a “front line battle” in the symbolical campaign of the 
developers with the customers, and its effect on the customers’ estimations of P and G may not 
be as crucial and effective as subsequent face-to-face negotiations. However, in circumstances 
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of customers reading advertisements, the customers do not have any duty to react. They possess 
discretions on whether or not to proceed to the face-to-face negotiations. In this regard, posting 
good promotional discourses to attract customers are still necessary.  
Bourdieu’s ideas offer me some inspiring ideas for the analysis of the developer-customer 
power relationship. However, the concept of power I would use in this part is still the concept 
of “transactional power” defined in chapter 2. “Transactional power” can be combined with 
Bourdieu’s idea in the following approach: as the definition of “transactional power” suggests, 
transactional power in a transactional system comes from the value in that system, which is 
defined by all actors’ needs; however, the most “transactionally powerful” actor has the largest 
influence on value definitions. The primary goal of advertising is exactly to define values – to 
demonstrate that advertised products are “valuable”. In the housing market, turning produced 
residences into incarnations of values help developers to control more resources (as products 
sell better) and helps to maintain developer’s power in the market as a transaction system. In 
this sense, the developers attempt not only to persuade the customers that their products meet 
the customers’ expectations in advertising, but also to affect the customers’ expectations to an 
extent that their actual products can match with those expectations. This means that power of 
developers come from and lies in their abilities of affecting demands of the customers. 
Consequently, my primary perspective for this part of analysis is to see how the developers try 
to define the value of residences in the advertisements.  
 
6.2 Distributions and correlations of codes 
 
I began my data analysis of the developer-customer power relationship part with the 
frequencies of codes being coded in the data. The frequencies show how “fierce” the symbolic 
campaign in the form promotional discourses is. I combined the frequencies in the two sample 
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cities in the same form for the sake of convenience in comparisons. See table 5.  
Table 5 Coding frequencies in housing advertisements as data collected in two sample cities 
Category Code Beijing Wuhan 
Count74 Cases74 %Cases74 Counts74 Cases74 %Cases74 
Topics Architecture 144 99 90.0% 175 108 95.6% 
Commerce 101 65 59.1% 128 84 74.3% 
Community 21 18 16.4% 25 21 18.6% 
Education 77 59 53.6% 89 67 59.3% 
Environment 191 99 90.0% 202 100 88.5% 
Health Care 31 28 25.5% 24 24 21.2% 
Location 117 89 80.9% 130 103 91.2% 
Transportation 93 77 70.0% 105 77 68.1% 
Themes Culture/Spirit 190 90 81.8% 196 102 90.3% 
Superiority/Scarcity 114 63 57.3% 136 87 77.0% 
Expertise 96 66 60.0% 98 69 61.1% 
Customized 56 42 38.2% 40 37 32.7% 
Social Elitism 130 68 61.8% 100 61 54.0% 
Cultural Elitism 69 51 46.4% 41 33 29.2% 
 
Table 5 alone contains quite a lot information. First of all, it seems that most of the cases 
contain multiple segment of contents that are coded by different codes, as indicated by the high 
total counts of the codes in both sample cities. In fact, 10 out of 14 codes appears in more than 
half of the cases in both cities. This suggests that the advertisements collected as data contain 
quite a large amount of information about multiple topics. This is actually supported by works 
of some other researchers. Luo et al. (2006) analyzed the contents of housing advertisements 
as samples collected from a Chinese newspaper. They found that those advertisements, in 
general, have relatively long texts and usually have multiple advertising appeals (emphasized 
                                                 
74 Because of the limited size of the page, I cannot explain the meaning of the numbers in each column in details in the 
table. “Counts” refers to the total numbers of each code’s appearance in all cases collected from the corresponding sample 
city. “Cases” shows how many cases in the corresponding sample city that each code appears (being coded on some contents 
of those cases). “%Cases” is the percentage of the count of “cases” in the total number of cases collected from the 
corresponding sample city. That is to say: in Wuhan, this percentage is the count of cases divided by 113; in Beijing, it is the 
count of cases divided by 110. 
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topics; more than half of the advertisements they analyzed contain more than three appeals, 
which is a quite high number for advertisements in the newspapers [Luo et al., 2006]). This 
supports Bourdieu’s idea (2005: 169) that the real-estate developers would offer whole sets of 
discourses in addition to the residences themselves. The Chinese real-estate developers seems 
like to produce discourses accompanying the residences they produce indeed. 
Separate counts of different codes also provide lots of information. The code with the 
highest count of frequency in both sample cities is Environment, which is also the code which 
appears in most cases in Beijing (tied with Architecture) and the fourth most common code in 
Wuhan in term of number of cases that the codes appear in total, following the three most 
common codes narrowly. This suggests that natural attributes of the residences is seen by the 
developers as a leading customer concern. According to Fleischer, concerns about environment 
are increasingly important discursive keywords that in many ways influence new middle- and 
upper-class urban residents’ residential choices (Fleischer, 2010: xxiii). Culture/Spirit75 is the 
second most common code in both sample cities. Being a code about purely subjective 
perceptions, its frequent appearance in the data indicates a ubiquity of “productions of the 
products (with discourses, as Bourdieu notices)” in advertisements. Architecture is the third 
most common code in term of coding frequency and the most prevalent in regard to the case 
frequencies in both cities. The synchronicity of the “top three most common codes” in the two 
sample cities as well as the distributions of these codes imply a nationwide tactic of advertising.  
Among other codes, Location is also a quite common one, being in the “top four” of codes 
                                                 
75 Initially, I created this code to refer to “cultural atmosphere” (wenhua fenwei), which is a very Chinese-styled concept. I 
tried to identify some meanings that can be associated with “culture” (wenhua) in Chinese in description of the code 
“cultural elitism”: erudite (most basic meaning), intelligent (either “clever” or “wise”), cultured [in Chinese, “wenhua” have 
no meaning of “education”], elegant, well-educated (some meanings associated with socioeconomic statuses). Nonetheless, 
there are more meanings that can be associated with “wenhua” in Chinese, depending on specific contexts. The thing should 
be noticed here is that: in Chinese, the word “wenhua” is traditionally associated with social status, which is a result of the 
cultural elitism tradition in traditional Chinese politics (Chinese feudal dynasties had used imperial examinations as method 
to nominate political elites for more than one thousand years prior to termination of Qing dynasty). That is to say, merely 
mentioning “culture” or any “cultural” things in advertisements can indicate elitism. In this research, I defined the code 
“cultural elitism” as “explicitly expressed elitism associated with culture”; nevertheless, in a Chinese context, most contents 
coded by “culture/spirit” could be seen as indications of elitism. 
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that appear in most cases in both sample cities, in addition to the three codes commented above. 
Customized appears less common compared with Expertise. This may reflect that the essence 
of the most microdistricts on the Chinese housing market are products of mass productions, 
which means that single residential units in these microdistricts can hardly be “customized”. 
The code that is least frequently seen – in both counts of codes and counts of cases, and in both 
sample cities as well – is Community. Given that the developers are likely to present in the 
advertisements what the customers care about, the low coding frequencies of Community 
indicates that: the customers do not care, or do not want to care, about who would live together 
with them in a same microdistrict in the end. This may be another indication of the developers’ 
avoidance of discussing the “mass production essence” of the products: they do not want the 
customers to be aware of the fact that they would only occupy a small dwelling unit among 
hundreds or thousands of units in the microdistrict eventually. But the reason might also be as 
simple as that the developers cannot foretell the compositions of future residents of the 
microdistricts in the advertising phase.  
In table 5, it could be seen that a same code normally appears in more cases and in higher 
total frequencies in Wuhan’s cases than in Beijing’s cases, which means that cases collected 
from Wuhan are more likely to give comprehensive descriptions than cases collected from 
Beijing. If that is the case, it would be worthy to pay some attention on codes that show higher 
coding frequencies among Beijing’s cases. Most notably, there are three “theme” codes more 
commonly seen in Beijing: Customized, Social Elitism, and Cultural Elitism. These three codes 
are all associated with the issue of elitism, or the issue of “social recognize” demands. This 
may be explained by a fact that customers in Beijing’s housing market have relatively better 
socioeconomic statuses than customers in Wuhan’s housing market.  
Co-occurrences in coding can provide some additional information about the relationships 
between the codes. I drew 2D maps with the help of the QDA Miner software for both sample 
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cities, and find similar patterns of co-occurrences in coding in the two projects. The 2D maps 
are shown in figure 4.1 and 4.2. I color both maps in three clusters, which is the best color plan 
to show similarities in clusters of co-occurrences. The size of the circle of a code represents the 
frequency of the code appears in the project. The lines connecting different circles indicates 
high co-occurring frequency of the two connected codes. 
In figure 4.1 and 4.2, division of clusters of codes in two sample cities highly resembles 
each other. The only difference in cluster division is that Cultural Elitism in Beijing is shown 
on the edge of the largest cluster, but in Wuhan it is found in the smallest cluster. Community 
is marginalized in both of the two figures, being in the smallest cluster in both cities (and alone 
in the smallest cluster of Beijing). The three codes of Commerce, Education, and Health Care 
form the middle-sized cluster in both projects. Along with the other two groups of three codes 
showing internal connections in the largest cluster – Architecture, Environment, Culture/Spirit; 
Location, Transportation, Superiority/Scarcity – they form the three major “triangles” seen in 
both graphs. All codes outside of these three code triads have no lines connected to each other 
on the graphs, and henceforth I would call these unconnected codes “isolated codes”. The triad 
of Architecture, Environment, and Culture (/Spirit; the latter half of this code’s name is omitted 
for simplification hereinafter) is undoubtedly the most important code triad, as the three codes 
in this triad are the three most frequently appeared codes in both sample cities. For that reason, 
I call this code triad “the main triad”. For the other two triads, I would call the triad of Location, 
Transportation, and Superiority (/Scarcity; the latter half of this code’s name is omitted too 
hereinafter) “location triad”; the triad of Commerce, Education, and Health Care “service triad”. 
In my analysis on the advertisements, I found that strategies of value definition used by Chinese 
developers in advertising are mostly concentrated on the codes belonging to the three triads. 
Henceforth, I would like to organize my discussion around the three codes triads in this chapter. 
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For most of the arguments in this chapter, I quote two cases (one from each sample city 
respectively) to support each of them. Like in the case of the previous chapter, this is to control 
the length of the paper. Nearly all arguments in this chapter can be supported by multiple cases 
in my data. I always quote cases in both sample cities for each argument (if applicable) to show 
Figure 4.1 Coding co-occurrence in the advertisements as cases collected in Beijing 
Figure 4.2 Coding co-occurrence in the advertisements as cases collected in Wuhan 
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the commonalities in the advertising strategies of the real-estate developers in the two cities. 
 
6.3 Two minor code triads and value assignment strategy 
 
My discussion covers both “location triad” and “service triad” in this part because both 
minor code triads are associated with services (in or around microdistricts). Creation of location 
triad is, on a large extent, due to the connection between the codes Superiority and Location, 
since the connection between the codes Location and Transportation is not surprising to be 
found. Frequent co-occurrences of Location and Superiority indicate that at least a considerable 
proportion of the practical superiorities of the microdistricts described in advertisements are 
relevant to the geographical location. Delving into the data, I find two types of logical 
connections between “location” and “superiority (or scarcity)” in the contents. The first type is 
that: “the location of the microdistrict is superior or scarce”: 
 
Platinum location – in the context of Beijing’s leap-and-bound super-rapid urbanization, 
the East 3rd Ring Road 76  sparkles lustrously like a diamond necklace. Opportunity of 
purchasing premises on East 3rd Ring Road is on the verge of extinct. Rare location, hard to be 
replicated again in next three years … location establishes highly valued linage and unlimited 
potentials [for our project]. (B51) 
 
…East Lake High-tech Development Zone is a national level development zone. The zone 
gathers many high-tech enterprises and higher education institutions; with an environment 
specially rewarded by nature, industry clusters forming scales, it became one of the districts 
with most potential of internationalized developments in Wuhan. (W82) 
 
Another type of logical connection is indicating “the microdistrict has superiority or rarity 
within a geographic scope (the location)”: 
 
…With 218 detached villas in total, [the project] is an extremely rare “comprehensively 
                                                 
76 East 3rd Ring Road (dong san huan) is the eastern section of 3rd Ring Road of Beijing. Area near East 3rd Ring Road is the 
most flourishing part of Beijing metropolitan. Beijing’s Central Business District (CBD) lies right on East 3rd Ring Road. 
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low density” residential community77 in central villa zone78. (B02) 
 
Our project, with an ultra-low space ratio in Wangjiawan district – at 2.2 – and a “high 
end to low end” product line – featuring a hybrid of yangfang, little high floors and high floors 
{see footnote 14 on page 25} – becomes a “star of scarcity” in the district. (W40) 
 
Differences between the two types of logic are about scopes on which comparisons are 
made. For the first type of logic, the scope is “citywide” or “metropolitan-wide”; for the second 
type of logic, the scope is territorial, or within a part of a city. Yet they share the same type of 
strategy: when praising the competitiveness of the microdistricts, the developers define 
competitiveness with the help of geographical locations.  
When would the geographical locations matter? As advertisements should meet with the 
customers’ expectations, the strategy of advertising locations can only make senses as long as 
the customers care about the locations of the microdistricts. In China, customers seems to have 
a need to pick districts in which to move. This need of Chinese customers may be relevant to 
concerns about reputations of neighborhoods and districts in the city, which affect the social 
identities and status of residents (Wang & Li, 2004). Such needs may be attributed to harsh 
commuting experiences, as high population densities in Chinese cities often cause 
transportation facilities to be routinely overcrowded, especially during rush hours. This may 
be proved by the correlation of the codes Transportation and Location shown in both projects. 
In fact, in the data, quite a lot of cases use transportation infrastructures and services to show 
advantages of the products’ locations: 
 
…Road network around the project is unimpeded and far reaching; Airport Express, 
Jingcheng Express, 6th Ring Road, Jingmi Road – multiple express ways and trunk roads extend 
directly to our project. The project is 1.3 kilometer from Shimen station of metro Line 15, 5 
kilometer from Airport Expressway; with its uniquely rewarded79 geographical advantages, 
                                                 
77 In Chinese housing advertisements, Chinese developers like to address the microdistricts they advertise for as 
“communities” (shequ). Please notice that my code Community in the code book does not intend to be used for this rhetoric, 
so these “communities” in promotional discourses are never counted for frequencies of Community shown in coding results. 
78 Beijing’s “central villa zone” lies in Shunyi District, adjacent to Beijing Capital International airport. Although it is called 
“villa zone”, not all microdistricts in this district are composed by villas; instead, there are just simply more villas in this 
district when compared than other districts. 
79 “Detianduhou” in original advertisement. This is a Chinese Chengyu meaning (continue on next page) 
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the project infuse powerful catalysts for new urban improvements of Shunyi. (B100) 
 
…[Our project is] located at south of Shouyi area and on the shore of Yangtze, adjacent 
to about-to-be-completed Yingwuzhou Yangtze River Bridge and under-construction 
Yangsigang Yangtze River Bridge; a superior geographical location. (W106) 
 
If that is the case, then in these advertisements the developers can be considered exploiting 
a weakness of Chinese customers: they lack the power to be mobile; therefore, using location 
and transportation may be seen as responses to the customers’ actual demands. However, it can 
still be seen in quotations above that the developers define some values on specific locations 
and transportation facilities and services in the advertisements regardless of the actual needs of 
the customers. Take the contents of case W106 quoted above as an example: is the location of 
being adjacent to two Yangtze River bridges always “valuable” for a customer? Certainly, for 
customers who own their private cars, especially for those who need to commute across 
Yangtze River as well as owning cars, “adjacent to two bridges” is a great advantage. But for 
a random customer, that feature may not always be valuable. Yet, by associating that feature 
with discourses of value judgements (“a superior geographical location”), “adjacent to two 
bridges” is endowed with a “value” that is bound with that feature. With this rhetoric, “adjacent 
to two bridges” now can stand for, can be converted into, and can be recognized as a value 
solely in itself. Hence, in this advertisement, the developer is making a value judgement for 
customers reading the advertisement, imposing a concept of “valuable” on the readers before 
the readers make their own value judgments. I identify such advertising strategy as “value 
assignment”. It is by all means not simple as duplicating customers’ dispositions, but is a latent 
attempt of altering the customers’ expectations. It fits with the idea I proposed in part 6.1: with 
the customers’ expectations being modified in this way, the actual products may now fit to 
those expectations. This has at least two benefits for the developers in Coleman’s approaches: 
                                                 
“uniquely/exclusively rewarded by the sky”. Out of cultural considerations, I would not translate this word as “uniquely 
rewarded by heaven”.  
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first, holding more values arguably reinforces the developers’ transactional power. Second, 
showing the customers more “values of the product” may help to increase customers’ 
estimations of G for purchasing that product in Coleman’s formula, which means customers 
are more likely to offer their trust.  
A similar situation occurs with the codes of “service triad”. The three codes of Commerce, 
Education, and Health Care often appear as clusters in the advertisements collected as data. 
Although Health Care is not shown linked with the other two codes by lines in Wuhan’s 
correlation 2D map, coding frequencies show that predominantly most Health Care coding in 
Wuhan’s cases co-occurrence with either Commerce or Education (17 out of 24 [71%] for both 
codes, although which 17 cases may vary). Appearances of services in the advertisements may 
also reflect demands of the customers in the contemporary Chinese housing market, which 
demands are actually proved by Fleischer’s field works (2010: 116). Yet, similar to the case of 
transportation services, value assignments are still required in advertising, because the specific 
services provided by the developers may not fulfill the customers’ actual expectations. 
Examples with assigning values to services are not hard to be found: 
 
…in the grand blueprint of 3 million square meter construction [of the project] in the 
future, services and industry formats such as ultra-large emporium, land-marking complex, 
seven stared hotel, creativity industry SOHO, 5A international office building, international 
education supports, all life span medical care system, and intelligent high-end living areas 
distribute perfectly, making every new day in Shouer Tiancheng enchanting and colorful, with 
intelligent lives can be touched by reaching out your hand… (B63) 
 
…Jinyinhu No.1, adjacent to Wangjiadun central business district, embark international 
business platform; metro Line 2, 6, and 7 connect the whole metropolitan in your network; 
aggregate diversified life supports: commercial, education, health care, business, 
entertainment, etc. High-end urban supporting services such as golf club, Orient Lucky City 
racecourse, Polar Maritime World [park], Shengshan Merriment World [theme park], Tianhe 
International Airport, and expo center comprehensively fabricate high-classed lives of 
residents. (W54) 
 
It could be seen that some services presented in these advertisements, like spa clubs, 
karaoke, and golf clubs, may be out of awareness of most customers on a housing market. But 
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as the developers assign value to them with these promotional discourses, they are successfully 
converted to advantages now. It is like presenting customers with surprises: “your lives can 
have far more possibilities that you never expected here!” 
One may argue that not all housing advertisements would introduce services as “grand” 
as those presented in the two quotations above. Indeed, many contents just nominate ordinary 
services that every customer in the market may need. Nonetheless, rhetoric that contains value 
judgements can still be observed in contents about ordinary services: 
 
…In addition to your enjoyment of convenient transportations, in periphery of the project 
there are also large scale commercial supporting services like Walmart, B&Q, Decathlon, and 
medical institutions like Tongren Hospital and Yizhuang Hospital, which provide further 
protections for your comfortable life. (B56) 
 
…Supporting services around Baoye Guanggu Lidu are mature and consummate. 
Embracing the two large supermarkets of Zhongbai and Wushang, you can enjoy a maturely 
fashioned commercial street of 20 thousand square meters by merely going downstairs. In 10 
minutes of driving, large scale emporiums and supermarkets such as Guanggu pedestrian zone, 
New World Department Store, Guanggu World, Walmart, Carrefour fully equipped for all your 
wishes; medical resources like Provincial Chinese Medicine Hospital, Wuhan 3rd Hospital are 
as easy for you to reach as the back of your hand; even more than these, you enjoy first-rank 
education resources in the country including 5th Primary School of Guanggu, The No.1 Middle 
School Affiliated To Central China Normal University, Canadian Maple International School 
on the site [of the project]. It could be said that Baoye Guanggu Lidu is born to be gorgeousness, 
fully demonstrating exquisite lives and enjoyments in international metropolitans. (W06) 
 
Ordinary services mentioned in the quotations above are what customers need to utilize 
in their daily lives. It is probable that the customers have taken services of those types into their 
accounts when they begin seeking for new dwellings, before they read these advertisements. 
In my opinion, value judgements on ordinary services in these advertisements are also value 
assignments, yet they are of a different approach. Instead of “pointing out things unaware of 
for customers and introduce their goodness”, value assignment of this type is like indicating 
“you may never expect that these routines of life could be this good”. Such “values” being 
assigned in this approach are based on possible elevations of daily lives rather than more 
possible choices. This may be manifested by inclinations of elitism that are shown in some 
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value assignments on regular services in some contents quoted above, which is, in essence, 
indications of “more elevated than ordinaries”: 
 
…fully demonstrating exquisite lives and enjoyments in international metropolitans. (W06) 
…comprehensively fabricate high-classed lives of residents. (W54) 
 
However, values assigned in these advertisements are ultimately carried by resources that 
developers can offer to the customers – services that can be provided by or can be easily 
accessed from the microdistricts. “Value” in the developer-customer transaction is guided to fit 
with resources that the developers control, which means that the developers’ advantage in 
transactional power is reproduced. Contents coded by the three codes in service triad also 
manifest that the developers are playing up “preexisted dispositions of the customers”: 
developers create grand imaginations for customers and telling customers that “these (things 
depicted in imaginations) are what you need”, or “these are what you should longing for”, to 
best fulfill their own interests. This is an iconic feature of value assignment strategy. Either the 
strategy of presenting new choices of lives or the strategy of indicating elevations in lives relies 
on generating imaginations for the customers. Imaginations generated in value assignments 
compose the only sphere where the value assigned to features of products can be verified.  
The difference of generated imagination and reality is not that conspicuous in value 
assignments shown by contents coded by the two minor code triads, as the primary sources of 
value assigned to services related with the products are (depicted or real) practical superiorities. 
However, in part 6.4, contents retrieved by codes of the main triad are discussed, where notion 
of generation of imagination, is crucial for discussions of the next part. 
 
6.4 Value assignments shown by the main code triad 
 
The main code triad is composed by the three most frequently appeared codes in both 
 77 
 
sample cities: Architecture, Environment, and Culture/Spirit (Culture for short). As shown by 
figure 4.1 and 4.2, this triad is formed with the co-occurrences of Culture and each of the other 
two codes respectively, although a connection between Architecture and Environment is also 
observed in Wuhan’s 2D correlation map. The main triad is different from the two minor triads 
in one aspect: the three codes composing it do not have any presumptive inherent connections 
that may explain why they are mentioned together in the advertisements. In contrast, all three 
codes of service triad represent services; Location and Transportation in location triad also 
have inherent relations that can explain their co-occurrence. Given that Culture is the code that 
joins the three codes in the triad together, the birth of the main triad can be conceived as: the 
theme-type code Culture/Spirit (claiming that the residences embody specific “cultures” or 
“spirits” and/or indicating that the customers can “live a spiritually contented life here”) is 
frequently associated with the two topics Architecture and Environment.  
Consulting specific contents in the data, I find that the co-occurrence of Architecture and 
Culture is mostly due to high frequency of architecture style’s recurrence in the advertisements. 
For sure, not all the contents coded as Architecture in the data are about architecture styles, but 
most contents coded simultaneously by Architecture and Culture are. Western styles and 
modern styles are most frequently mentioned amid these contents:  
 
…Our project adopts free, bold, untrammeled Baroque architecture style; the main part 
of outer surfaces80 choose sandstone as material, emphasizing elegant Italian styles. (B25) 
 
…The general architecture style of Shunmin Yisheng Huayuan microdistrict is modernist, 
[combine] with fashions from Northern Europe, bright and simple. (W79) 
 
Architecture styles of Chinese and other parts of Asia are also seen in the cases: 
 
… The project uses an enclosed design, in concert with layout of traditional courtyard 
houses {siheyuan}; in designs of details of structures, [the project] use modern techniques to 
refine traditional Chinese symbols, ensuring the project’s thick cultural foundations and high 
                                                 
80 The word in original advertisement literally means “façade” in Chinese. However, as this word here refers to outer 
surfaces of residential blocks (apartment buildings), I would not like to use “facade” in translation. 
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quality images get full representations, and aiming to manufacture the flagship and leading 
figure of neo Chinese architecture in the district. (B68) 
 
…In terms of residence layout design, [the project] use Chinese styled conjoining 
corridors running through three layers of Southeast Asian styled wide surface courtyards, 
supplemented by delicate landscape pieces; in skilled harness of multiple scene lending 
techniques, highlighting generosity of scenes of guest-welcoming mansions. (W33) 
 
Introductions of architecture styles, however, do not usually cover all aspects of the 
residential blocks. In fact, most introductions about styles of residential blocks in the data 
concentrate on the exterior features of the residential blocks, especially exterior decorations of 
the buildings: 
 
… [The project adopts an] elegant European architecture style, inheriting temperaments 
of classicism; sculpted with a “tri-sectioned” design conducted with bottom part, middle part, 
and top part. Outer surfaces of the three parts are decorated with horizontal and vertical lines; 
the surfaces themselves are perfectly assembled by wall tiles, stone materials, and coating, 
conveying fashion, elegancy, and calmness and showing blatant modern textures and lavish 
sense of stratifications. (B99) 
 
…Mingshi No. 1 followed the tradition of Nanyi Bali Haoting’s81 excellent qualities; 
using modern architecture ideas, engineering techniques, and materials, [the project] presents 
simple yet extremely modern-feeling architecture style. Using delicate outer wall decorations 
and outer surface balcony designs to compose a vocabulary of architecture symbols, and using 
imposing block appearances formed by concavities and bulges in the general shape and 
“classical art-deco” styled outer surface to limitlessly improve fashion degrees of the 
structure… (W67) 
 
I consider references of “styles and cultural attributes” of exterior decorations to represent 
one of the most extreme forms of value assignments in my data. Although good exterior 
decorations can promote the market values of the premises, these decorations may not always 
create “cultural atmospheres” in property owners’ lives. This is particularly true for exterior 
decorations of residential blocks: they remain unseen during most of the times that property 
owners live inside the blocks. However, as have been illustrated above, predominately most 
residences sold on the Chinese housing market are found in residential blocks. Both of the two 
                                                 
81 Another microdistrict project finished by a same developer ahead of the case W67. 
 79 
 
cases B99 and W67 presented in quotations above, for instance, containing no villas but only 
apartment buildings. Quite often, styles of exterior designs and decorations usually do not cover 
the interior of the residential blocks. Take B99 and W67 as examples again: residences sold in 
the two microdistricts are “maopi fang”, which means newly finished residences with little or 
no interior decorations at all in Chinese. So for residents of these blocks, they have the freedom 
to decorate interiors of their dwelling units as whatever styles they like. Thus a question occurs: 
how much sense do exterior decorations of residential blocks really make on the residents’ lives 
inside those blocks? Nonetheless, Chinese developers really like to talk about exterior 
decorations in advertisements. 
Henceforth, I define these descriptions of architecture styles as practices of one of most 
extreme forms of value assignments in the data. Value assignments of this type do not provide 
imagined elevation on daily lives or imagined possible new life choices, but try to draw 
illusions of spirits or tastes superior to other people for the customers. In fact, some researchers 
have also noticed this phenomenon of the Chinese developers using “styles” in their housing 
advertisements to create an “international” imagination. For example, Li (2012) specifically 
studied real-estate advertisements in China that contains contents written in English. He found 
that those contents written in English often shows “an expressed orientation towards a global 
community”, which matches my findings discussed above. Li also considers that those contents 
written in English express an elitism altitude, “an aspiration of becoming powerful” (Li, 2012), 
and as a matter of fact, this is demonstrated by some contents of advertisements in my data that 
describe exterior decorations of the residential blocks as well: 
 
…Baoli Shidai adopt “the classic for a century” art-deco architecture style, deploying 
novel, unique structure modeling, oriental-wisdom-infused structure substances, strong-
texture-feeling marble materials, immaculate reliefs, and ingenious, exclusive lines and shapes 
as carriers of spirit, not only to express a noble feeling of not surrender to ordinariness, but 
also to perfectly reproduce those eras of flourishment [in the past] and to epitomize a revive of 
urban spirit. (W08) 
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Li (2012) considers that the Chinese developers’ practices of using internationalism and 
elitism discourses in advertising is associated with the transitions in the Chinese identities. In 
my opinion, the developers do utilize the Chinese customers’ desire of forging social, national, 
and cultural identities, but they utilize this desire in the way that Bourdieu (2009: 55) indicates:  
stimulate and arouse that disposition. The developers appear to offer the customers “identities” 
with the “styles” in the promotional discourses in the advertisements; however, these seeming 
offers are in essence rebranding of the products of the developers as “proofs of identities”. 
Using the “architecture styles” advertising strategy as an example: as building enclosed 
residential compounds composed of high rise apartment buildings is not a common practice 
worldwide, building apartment blocks and then decorate those blocks with elements of foreign 
or traditional architecture styles is in fact a highly “contemporary Chinese style” practice. Its 
recognition as a “foreign practice” or “traditional pattern” in the Chinese housing market can 
only be justified by the prevalent promotional discourses in the market. In this sense, values 
assigned with this strategy can only be verified by the promotional discourses in the housing 
advertisements. Consequently, I would like to classify this strategy as a new type, in order to 
tell it apart with the aforementioned “imagination generation”, which is based on realties or 
possible realties. I would like to call this newly introduced strategy “offering tempting illusion”. 
This new strategy still reproduces transactional power advantages of the developers, as the 
developers lead the customers with this strategy to believe that what the products provided by 
the developers are what being wanted, or should be wanted, by the customers.  
Value assignment strategies of showing plausible yet false “foreign styles” also appear in 
descriptions about microdistricts’ greening designs, which came to my eyes when I did cross 
retrievals of contents with Environment and Culture with QDA Miner, the pair of codes that 
shows the other co-occurrence in the main triad: 
 
…A panoramic presentation of Toscana styles, an authentic atmosphere of French 
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townships. [Our garden features] staggered higher and lower roof ridges, artificially-antiqued 
stone structures in cream color, arched windows with elegant curves, wood corridors can 
provide private times, quaint yet untrammeled styled iron-art fences, retro-European styled 
lanterns, and more than 120 types of rare flowers and grasses, more than 30 types of trees, and 
more than 50 types of bushes. (B28) 
 
…uphold the integrity of European imperial garden style, all patterned land tiles, iron arts, 
stone sculptures, outfalls, iron lantern arts, and garden scene pieces have to be customized 
according to designs of architecture. Sunshine lawns, multicolored blooms, evergreen bushes, 
tidily pruned short trees, and towering tall trees – meticulously coined three-dimensional five-
layer scenes and customized style making villa district presenting decorous, artistic senses as 
if a manor of 18th century. (W11) 
 
Obviously, the same strategy is used by the developers in these advertisements. What an 
authentic royal garden or modern garden looks like does not matter (in fact, an example of an 
indifferent developer is shown in case B28: Toscana is not in France); the only thing matters 
here is that: customers may find “royal” and “modernism” of superior classes or tastes, and 
may subsequently believe the designs of gardens are “valuable”.  
Nonetheless, “offering illusions” is not the only type of value assignment shown in the 
co-occurrence of Environment and Culture. Contents coded by Environment while also coded 
by Culture usually refer to either natural landscapes outside of the microdistricts or artificial 
gardens views and/or waterscapes in the microdistricts. In both cases, the “Environment” can 
actually be touched and experienced by residents (present or future ones), which is of great 
difference with exterior decorations of residential blocks. Therefore, imagination generated in 
these cases is based on realities or possible realities: 
 
… With the bluish green, rippling ancient Yan Lake steps away in [the project’s] back, a 
life style like idylls determines that communications between people are more harmonious 
[than elsewhere]. The community is totally infused by water; in leisure time, fetch a stool, take 
a rod, make a pot of tea, and enjoy pleasures of free fishing, isn’t that wonderful! (B19) 
 
…Step forward to change the views, let scenes change floor by floor. Exclusively enjoy 
private home garden on the first floor; moving up to hear songs of birds and smell scents of 
flowers in European styled gardens in the courtyards; then reaching top floor and enjoy natural 
sceneries of Lujia Hill and Tangrenhai Lake there. (W62) 
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In fact, imagination generation based on realities is also observed in the contents referred 
to architectures of the microdistrict. After all, exterior decoration is only one aspect of 
architecture; on some other aspects, using possible realities to generate life imaginations is an 
ideal approach of value assignment. For instance, introductions of suites (dwelling units) in the 
microdistricts sometimes come with contents generating life imagination in the advertisements: 
 
…Our project specially designs micro 1 bedroom suites of 50-58 square meters; micro 2 
bedroom suites of 70-78 square meters; micro 3 bedroom suites of 100-118 square meters 
{numbers listed above are all usable structural areas}; compact rooms show considerate cares 
on residents’ life arrangements, ultra-low total price help property owners easily realize 1st 
desired dreams of lives. (B39) 
 
…73 to 136 square meter 3 to 4 bedrooms, all-purpose flexible spaces, zero waste with 
scientific designs. 74 square meter delicate 3 bedrooms, 85 square meter cozy 4 bedrooms, 129 
square meter comfortable 4 bedrooms, every suite is upright and air permeable, every room is 
adequately lighted. Making you discover unexpected surprise on every turning around, marvel 
ingenious designs on every reaching out [your hands]. (W29) 
 
Generation of life imagination can also be found in contents that are coded simultaneously 
by the two topic codes in the main triad, Architecture and Environment. As I coded all natural 
elements with the code Environment, this combination of code can retrieve contents of “natural 
elements that can be experienced in your home” in data. Value assignments conducted by 
generating life imagination are frequently seen in contents of that type: 
 
Dongya Yinxiang Taihu, explaining pursues of classes and tastes in delicate spaces. 52 to 
57 square meter exquisite 1 bedroom, 63 to 70 square meter delicate 2 bedrooms, 76 to 78 
square meter practical 3 bedrooms, free choices from 6 layouts; south-faced, north-south-faced 
layouts with elaborate and practical designs, wide faces, flowing air and warm sunshine are 
no longer luxuries; they are going to become part of your life, subject to your touch and taste. 
(B11) 
 
…Area range of suites in blocks no. 4, 5, and 6 of Xinchangjiang Xiangxie Qintai is 49 to 
222 square meter. Layouts are upright and air permeable, high in usable percentage, and more 
considered on scene enjoyment. Wide face, big views, let scenes of hill and lake and views of 
exquisite gardens frozen within frameworks of the windows. Most dwelling units have private 
in suite gardens. Entering first into gardens when returning home offers great pleasant on body 
and mind, and obtain more spaces at the same time. (W96) 
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Conclusively, I think there are two major types of value assignments shown by co-
occurrences of the three codes of the main triad: generating imaginations of lives based on 
realities, which is discussed once above in part 6.3; and, offering tempting illusion, which is 
newly introduced in this part. Alongside the “presenting possible life choices for the future” 
strategy discussed in part 6.3, they are the three major approaches to conduct value assignments 
that I observed in the data. I think a spectrum of value assignment approaches with practical 
and illusory as the two poles explains the differences between these approaches better. Offering 
tempting illusion assign values that are only justifiable in the promotional discourses presented 
by advertisements, therefore is the least practical and most illusory approach. Presenting 
possible options of lives, on the other hand, are based on descriptions of realities, and hence is 
the most practical approach. Generating imagination of lives with realities or possible realities 
is based on facts, but scenes depicted in imagination generated in this way happen by limited 
probabilities. Therefore, this approach of value assignment should situate between the other 
two approaches on the spectrum.  
Despite these differences, the three approaches nonetheless share common features of 
value assignments as an advertising strategy: they begin with pre-existing dispositions or 
desires of the customers; they make value judgements for readers of the advertisements, thus 
latently affect the customers’ expectances on residences; values assigned by these approaches 
can be justified, and can only be justified in the imagination generated by these approaches. 
The values they assigned to certain contents in advertisements are not often pointed to facts in 
realities, but always represents the resources controlled by the developers, which helps the 
developers to reproduce their advantage in transactional power over, or their domination on, 
the customers. 
 
So in conclusion of this chapter, I consider the most crucial advertising strategy in term 
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of transactional power used by the developers on the Chinese housing market to be what I call 
“value assignment”: to define values for features of the residences as products with promotional 
discourses in advertisements. By value assignments, the developers define features of their 
products as “valuable”, thus satisfy their own interests, gain and keep control on resources, and 
therefore retain their transactional power, which further ensures their capacity of defining 
values at the next instance. As an advertising strategy, value assignment could increase the 
customers’ estimated gains. Hence, the customers are more likely to offer trust to the developers 
according to Coleman’s formula. As a part of reproduction of transactional power, value 
assignment helps developers to define the concept of value in the Chinese housing market as a 
transactional system. Since the developers possess the ability of value definition, the customers 
are guided to accept the actual features of the products that could be provided by the developers, 
and are less likely to have opportunities to express their own opinions on values in the 
transactional system of Chinese housing market.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
7.1 Conclusion: a dual domination 
 
Analyses in chapter 5 and 6 outline the “dual-domination” faced by Chinese residence 
buyers: in the political domain, the state deploys its governmental power to suppress the 
customers’ freedom of choosing strategies of actions, imposing a first domination on the 
customers; in the economic domain, the developers monopolize the rights of defining what are 
“valuable” for residences as commodities and induce the customers to latently accept the 
residences they produced to be incarnations of “valuableness”, imposing a second domination 
on the customers. Additionally, I would like to reiterate a fact: predominately most Chinese 
urban residents are not able to produce residences legally on their own, because Chinese local 
governments normally transfer lands to real-estate developing companies only. Hence, most 
Chinese customers can only obtain residences legally by: entering the legal market, meeting all 
requirements posed by the policies (some of them can be hindered in this step for their whole 
lives), choosing from the products that the developers supply, and forming long-term bonds 
with the residences they choose (thanks to the purchase restricting policies). Their freedom of 
making decisions are reduced by the state and the developers (via mass production instead of 
customized production) in addition to the laws of a seller’s market (constantly rising prices). 
Subjected to this structure of restrictions, the Chinese customers are unlikely to have a good 
time. Indeed, some problems of housing accessibilities in China that are noted by the work of 
Yang and Chen (2014: 130-132) – the high housing expenditures; the housing affordability 
problem for rural to urban migrants (reflected in the discriminations based on hukou statuses); 
and the disparity between the subsidized residences as supplied and the needs of the Chinese 
customers – remain to be unsolved in 2013, as demonstrated by my data. 
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In my opinion, this structure of restrictions supports the idea that the Chinese state and the 
real-estate developers form a “community of interest” that Paik (2014) discusses. The state’s 
motivation of maintaining this structure has been pointed out by other researchers: it profit in 
the transactions with the developers, especially in the land transfers. Some researchers believe 
that land transfer is the major source of financial incomes of Chinese local governments (Li & 
Huang, 2006). Statistics shows that, back in 2006, land transfer fees composed approximately 
40% of annual financial income for Chinese local governments; by 2010, this percentage had 
already raised to 71.7% (Wang, 2012). Thus, maintaining the established order of the housing 
market offers lots of benefits for the Chinese state, which actually generates a somewhat 
pejorative phrase “land finance” (tudi caizheng) in Chinese. This research, on the other hand, 
explains how the Chinese developers integrate their strategies into the order of the 
contemporary Chinese housing market albeit subjecting to the state’s domination: they profit 
from the mechanism of transactional power’s reproduction. Within the structure of restrictions 
placed by the state on all actors in the market, the developers manage to fabricate and 
monopolize a discursive system of “value-judging” residences. And, in fact, this system of 
value judgement not only guarantees the interests of the developers, but also reinforces the 
contemporary pattern of operations of the Chinese housing sector. Since this system of value 
judgement tells the customers “this is what you should look for” instead of “this is what we 
can provide”, the customers are less likely to question the order of residence production in the 
Chinese housing market. As the developers find themselves in a stable position in the current 
order of the market – from which position they can also satisfy themselves – naturally they 
may choose to support the current order of the market and the creator of that order: the state. 
However, this research also reveals that the Chinese state is dominating the developers as 
well, and the state does not always treat the developers as allies. When the state claims that 
regulations on developers is aimed at controlling residence prices (see part 5.1.2), it actually 
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conveys a message: the developers are responsible for rises in residence prices. Ironically, my 
data actually reveals that the developers also denounce the state occasionally as not fulfilling 
obligations of governances. An example in my data is a comment of on Beijing’s introduction 
of “self-residing commercial residences” (see part 5.1.2) from Ren Zhiqiang, a Chinese real-
estate tycoon who was also often recognized for his criticisms on the Chinese real-estate 
policies: 
 
…“Using such method of transfer lands [and] let the developers construct self-residing 
commercial residences [on the transferred lands] – essence of this [method] is the government 
shirking things it should do and burden them on the market.” Ren Zhiqiang pointed out, [to] 
solve the dilemma [of inadequate supply] on residence [markets], [it should,] as the “old 
saying” goes: “subsidized [managed] by the governments, market affairs [managed] by the 
market”. (N53) 
 
Ren’s attitude seems to be in accordance with his identity as a developer; nevertheless, his 
proposition of “using laws of markets to solve the problem of inadequate supply” is hard to 
defend, especially in a seller’s market. Perhaps the primary effect of Ren’s words is to accuse 
the state. Interestingly, Ren was an executive of a state-owned real-estate company rather than 
a private-owned company, which means he was actually a cadre appointed by some agents of 
the state. Hence, from my point of view, his criticism arouses concern about the power struggles 
between the developers and the state and in the hierarchy of the state.  
Nevertheless, I cannot further discuss Ren’s intentions and strategies with the discoveries 
of this research as I did not focus on the relationship between the state and the developers in 
my analysis. What should be noticed here, in my opinion, is that the “dual-domination” is a 
game between three parties (at least; with a more detailed taxonomy of actors, more participants 
in the game can be defined; and by doing so, a more complex structure of the game would be 
drawn) in addition to a system of dominations and exploitations. The state and the developers 
diverge in identities, roles, targets, and interests, which unavoidably leads to disagreements and 
conflicts between the two parties. An effect of these disagreements and conflicts is that the 
 88 
 
structure of the restrictions in the Chinese housing market may become somehow obscure in 
the perspective of the customers. Explicit, resolute common visions about the restraints in the 
market, in this way, are hard to form among the customers. Consequently, the customers are 
less likely to carry out united oppositions toward any of the dominating parties (the state or the 
developers), which further strengthens the dual-domination. In other words, in this three-party-
game, the customer suffers from domination in two power relationships, but is incapacitated in 
fighting back at the same time due to the complex structure of the transactional system. The 
“dual-domination” is by far not a simple sum of the two separate power relationships.  
The topic of “purchase restrictions” in the Chinese housing market seemingly has not 
received enough attentions from the overseas researchers, and also has not been sufficiently 
studied with sociological approaches. A possible reason is that the controls on purchases is a 
relatively new phenomenon in the Chinese housing market. Analysis of the historical 
development of the Chinese housing market made by Wu and Wang (2005) notices that the 
Chinese housing prices began to show a trend of excessive growth in 2001, but does not record 
any purchase restrictions placed on the Chinese customers, which indicates that those 
restrictions had not taken shapes in 2005. Many works on the “purchase restrictions” have been 
completed by the mainland Chinese researchers, but mostly from economic and juristic 
perspectives. More analyses on the evolution of the state power in the Chinese housing market 
in recent years would be definitely welcomed. The new forms and effects of the Chinese state 
power in the housing market not only reflect the still ongoing Chinese reform in the housing 
sector, but also indicates a substantial change in the Chinese state’s role. After stepping down 
from the position of “ultimate planner in housing sector”, the Chinese state is adopting new 
techniques of power in order to maximize its own interests. This transition of the state’s 
strategies is an issue of significant importance, as it may decide the evolutions of the Chinese 
housing market in the following years. 
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Likewise, the topic of “offering discourses as part of the product” in the Chinese housing 
advertising strategies also deserves more explorations. Although there are researchers who 
have paid attention to the contents of the Chinese real-estate advertisements (for instance, Luo 
et al. [2006] and Li [2012]. Fleischer also notices the imaginations fabricated by the textures 
in the Chinese real-estate advertisements [2010: 132]; however, she mainly focused on the 
meaning of that generation of imagination in the regards of stratifications of the Chinese society 
in her work, and discussed little about the relationship between the imaginations generated by 
the advertisements and the actual demands of the Chinese customers), more probes could be 
made on the issue of how the real-estate developers manipulate the demands of the customers 
via those contents. The advertising strategies of the Chinese real-estate developers show that 
the developers play highly proactive roles in the Chinese housing market, and are even capable 
of defining some latent rules of transactions in the market. My analysis of the dual-domination 
suggests that “the developer” is a vital actor in the Chinese housing market as a transaction 
system, and it is impossible to discuss the state’s role, interests, and strategies in that system 
without taking the developers’ actions into considerations. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
the developers have become the de facto possessors of the legalities and capabilities of 
residence productions in the Chinese housing market. Although still subject to the state’s power 
right now, they probably would play even more proactive roles in the market in the future, 
which may further change the patterns of transactions in the market significantly. In this sense, 
the roles of the Chinese real-estate developers in the Chinese housing market deserves future 
inquiries. 
 
7.2 Methodology reviews 
  
This was the first time that I conducted a research with a large amount of data in this field. 
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My inexperience, as well as limitations on time and data accessibilities, restrained the outcome 
of this research greatly. When I was writing this dissertation, I also reviewed my methodology. 
I consider that many aspects of this research can be improved.  
My first consideration of the methodology is of the data choice. I chose to use second-
hand data primarily due to the limitation of time. News reports, the data I use for state-customer 
power relationship analysis, have their advantages when used as data: they can provide 
relatively large amount of information, and can also offer information that are hard to obtain in 
fieldworks – in the case of this research, the behaviors of the Chinese state and its agents. 
However, the fact that the information in news reports are selected and manipulated by the 
media remains a concern. For the state-customer power relationship, the news reports cannot 
illustrate all interactions between the two actors and all strategies used by the two actors. On 
the contrary, the media may tend to select information about rare occasions to disseminate via 
their reports. My discoveries demonstrate that some of the customers are using their own 
methods to evade the purchase restrictions; yet my data cannot tell that how many customers 
are using those methods exactly. The news reports in my data also cannot tell much about the 
strategies of the customers who follow the rules set up by the state. Furthermore, they cannot 
provide much information about the power struggles in the hierarchy of the state as well, and 
that is the reason why I created a code for this phenomenon in the codebook but eventually do 
not carry out some discussions on this topic, albeit the topic has already been explored by many 
other researchers. For further explorations of these aspects of the state-customer relationship, 
I think that using first-hand data is definitely required.  
The housing advertisements, similarly, also reveal only one aspect of the developer-
customer power relationship, and cannot illustrate may other aspects of that relationship. Most 
noticeably, they do not contain information about the face-to-face negotiations between the 
developers and the customers, one the most crucial parts of the developer-customer relationship. 
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First-hand data, on the contrary, can record the details of the direct interactions between the 
two parties, and would be an ideal choice for analyses on that part of the developer-customer 
relationship. Bourdieu’s work (2009: 148-175) on the developer-customer relationship in the 
French housing market, for instance, uses multiple conversations between the sales agents of 
real-estate companies and the customers to present how the two parties reach agreements on 
residence sales. However, I think that studies of the real-estate advertising strategies can be 
good supplements for researches of direct transactions between the developers and customers 
that are conducted with first-hand data. For example, I speculate that the context of residence 
value judgments fabricated by the “value assignments” in the Chinese housing advertisements 
would also shape the context of the face-to-face negotiations between the agents of developers 
and the clients in the Chinese housing market. 
My second consideration of the methodology is of the scope of the research, especially 
the scope of time. Data from one single year does not show the changes in the Chinese housing 
market very well, especially in the regards of policy changes. I collected only news reports 
published in 2013, henceforth the data turned out to show only the policy changes took place 
in 2013. If I would focus on the changes in the policies only, I suggest that expand time scope 
slightly (for example, to three consecutive years) can be a better choice.  
Conclusively, methodology of this research is imperfect in many aspects. I sincerely hope 
that the discoveries as well as the shortcomings of this research could inspire other researchers 
who would study the Chinese housing market in the future.  
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